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Racial minorities have made great strides in the United 
States since the onset of the modern civil rights movement 
during the 1950s.  The quest to gain equal status, however, 
was far from complete.  Today, blacks trail whites on nearly 
every measure of socioeconomic well-being.  Much of the 
same can be said for other groups, as racial minorities have 
been systematically relegated to lower stations in American 
society.
Nowhere are these struggles more evident than in the lives 
of youth from communities of color, particularly males of 
color.  Despite advances during the last several decades, 
millions of boys and young men still face daunting 
challenges in obtaining an education, finding quality 
jobs, and becoming productive members of the American 
community.  A change in policy is needed, as retrenchment 
of the social welfare state and the hardening of criminal 
justice policies have worked to limit the life chances of 
males from communities of color.  In the current political, 
economic, and social context, young males of color also 
need guidance and support if they are going to successfully 
navigate America’s unsteady racial terrain.  If such actions 
are not taken, many will become part of a new generation 
that is undereducated, unemployed, and unprepared for 
the challenges that they will face in the 21st century.  For 
the children who survive into adulthood but fail in life, 
prison is the one institution waiting to receive them.
As of 2003, 2.2 million sentenced inmates were held in 
U.S. prisons, up from 204,211 in 1973.  The incarceration 
rate grew from 93 per 100,000 residents in 1973 to 482 
per 100,000 by 2003.  To contain expanding inmate 
populations, the number of state prisons grew from 592 
in 1974 to 1,023 by June 2000.  By that date, there were 
1,668 adult institutions in the United States.  While 
most of these were public facilities, private corrections 
companies have designed, constructed, and managed 
others since the mid-1980s.
Blacks and Latinos, who represent 26 percent of the 
U.S. population, comprised 63 percent of the number 
of inmates under state or federal custody in 2003.  Black 
men between the ages of 25 and 29 had the highest 
incarceration rate of any group (9,262 per 100,000), 
with nine percent of all black men between the ages of 
25 and 29 in prison at yearend 2003.  Minorities are 
disproportionately represented in the nation’s juvenile 
justice systems as well; blacks (1,004 per 100,000), 
American Indians (632 per 100,000), and Latinos (485 per 
100,000) each had higher custody rates than whites (212 
per 100,000).
As this rise in the inmate population has occurred, a 
greater share of public funds has been committed to 
prisons.  The federal government increased its expenditures 
on corrections from $541 million in 1982 to $5.2 billion 
in 2001—an increase of 861 percent.  State expenditures 
grew 538 percent, rising from $6 million in 1982 to $38.4 
billion in 2001.  The largest increase in state corrections 
expenditures occurred in 1990, when it grew by roughly 
19 percent.  Since then, spending has grown at an annual 
rate of 7.1 percent.  Although states spend more money 
on other functions of government, expenditures have 
increased at a greater rate for corrections than for other 
functions.
These developments have led many analysts and social 
commentators to suggest that America suffers from a 
prison-industrial complex (PIC) akin to the military-
industrial complex that first emerged in the 1950s.  The 
prison-industrial complex, however, is best understood as a 
hybrid subgovernment/issue network constructed around 
the issues of crime, punishment, and prisons.  Prisons have 
become the centerpiece of a multi-billion dollar industry, 
and several businesses have placed themselves in strategic 
positions to profit from prison growth.  Private corrections 
firms also have emerged as important actors in U.S. prison 
systems.  At the same time, some communities (especially 
in California, Florida, Missouri, New York, Ohio, and 
Texas) pursue prisons with the zeal of major cities courting 
professional sports teams, based on the belief that prisons 
offer an environmentally clean industry that can bring 
“recession-proof” jobs, development, and even federal 
funds based on U.S. Census counts.
Overview
This paper evaluates the impact of the prison-industrial 
complex on males from communities of color.  In 
particular, it asks the following questions: What is the 
impact of the large increases in the proportion of state and 
local public funds dedicated to corrections?  To what extent 
has the private corrections industry influenced and driven 
national, state, and local policy regarding criminal justice 
policy and programs?
To answer these questions, the paper first clarifies the 
meaning of the prison-industrial complex.  It then 
provides a historical overview of trends in the political 
and intellectual discourses on crime and punishment and 
explores how these ideas influenced the formulation of 
public policy.  The paper then examines the development 
and influence of the private corrections industry, followed 
by a review of the status of minority youth in criminal 
and juvenile justice systems.  Particular attention is paid 
to the following jurisdictions: California, the District of 
Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, 
Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies Health Policy Institute
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Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, and Texas.  Given 
their racial and ethnic diversity, what we learn from these 
jurisdictions can help us to understand more about other 
states with similar racial compositions.
Major Findings
Changes in Crime and Drug Control Policy
The shifting politics of crime and punishment left an 
indelible mark on the formulation and implementation 
of public policy.  During the 1960s, federal and state 
lawmakers began to call for “law and order.”  Specifically, 
they argued that the nation’s crime problem could only 
be solved by hardening criminal justice policy.  By the 
1970s, new policies emphasized deterrence, incapacitation, 
punishment, and victims’ rights rather than rehabilitation 
and treatment.  This new paradigm was fueled by the 
campaigns of issue-seeking politicians and commentaries 
from the scholarly community.  During the 1980s and 
1990s, the call for “law and order” gave way to the “get 
tough” movement, which sparked president-led wars on 
crime and drugs.  This movement also targeted juvenile 
offenders, particularly those living in central cities who 
were young, black, or Latino.  Some scholars portrayed 
these young people as “super-predators.”  At the same time, 
the liberal perspective on crime and punishment faded into 
the background as the “get tough” movement enjoyed the 
support of members of both political parties.
In this environment, new policies were adopted that 
hardened both the adult and juvenile justice systems.  
Some of the harshest laws enacted at the federal level of 
government include:
• The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970
• The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970
• The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
• The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
• The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
• The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994
These policies helped to facilitate or were influenced by 
changes in the states.  For instance:
• By 2002, 42 states and the District of Columbia
had adopted some form of “Truth-in-Sentencing,” a 
measure designed to ensure that offenders served a 
substantial portion of their court-imposed sentences 
before being released.  Twenty-nine jurisdictions 
require that offenders serve 85 percent of the court-
imposed sentence.
• By 2001, 16 states had abolished early release by
discretion of a parole board for all offenders.
• Between 1993 and 1996, 24 states added “Three
Strikes and You’re Out” laws to existing sentencing 
laws.  Three Strikes measures have enhanced prison 
sentences for violent and habitual offenders.
• By the end of the 1990s, all states had some type
of mandatory sentencing provision that targeted 
drug offenders.  Following the precedent set by the 
federal government with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1986, many states enacted exceptionally harsh 
penalties for drug crimes involving crack cocaine.
• Between 1992 and 1997, 47 states and the District
of Columbia approved measures that made 
their juvenile justice systems more punitive.  In 
particular, states made it easier to transfer juveniles 
to adult criminal justice systems, gave criminal 
and juvenile courts expanded sentencing options, 
and changed or removed traditional juvenile court 
confidentiality provisions by making juvenile 
records and proceedings more open.
These policies, enacted incrementally, have done little to 
reduce crime and victimization.  They have contributed 
to soaring incarceration rates across the country, however.  
They also have led to sizeable increases in the amount of 
money dedicated to criminal and juvenile justice systems.  
The Rise and Influence of the Private Corrections Industry
Private prison companies such as the Corrections 
Corporation of America and Geo Group, Inc. have 
worked to cash in on federal, state, and local government 
corrections expenditures.  Since the mid-1980s, private 
corrections companies have designed, built, and operated 
their own prison facilities.  Although private prisons have 
been plagued by scandal since the late 1990s, state and 
federal governments have continued to patronize the 
industry.  Today, 6.5 percent of all sentenced prisoners and 
five percent of local jail inmates are held in private prisons.  
Some states make greater use of private facilities than 
others; for example, New Mexico sends a larger percentage 
of its inmates (44 percent) to private prisons than any 
other state.  Texas leads the nation with 16,750 sentenced 
inmates in private prisons.  Georgia (4,589) and Florida 
(4,330) also are ranked in the top five.  
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While some analysts have found this to be problematic, a 
general consensus exists about the success of the following 
programs or approaches to prisoner reentry:
• Family therapy and parent training directed at
delinquents or pre-delinquents and their families 
• Education programs that link prison programs to
community-based resources after release
• Vocational training and/or work release programs
• Programs that promote job readiness skills for ex-
offenders
• Job training for older males no longer under the
supervision of criminal justice systems
• Drug treatment and substance abuse programs
• Prison-based therapeutic communities involving
clients (i.e., inmates) who are housed in a prison 
setting isolated from the general institutional 
population
• Halfway houses that assist in the transition from
prison to the community
What Doesn’t Work?
• Gun buy-back efforts
• “Scared straight” programs
• Rehabilitation programs grounded in ambiguous,
unstructured counseling
Practices in the States
California
Learning from Other States
• State officials hosted Dr. Reginald A. Wilkerson,
director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation 
and Corrections.  Wilkerson is credited with 
developing a model reentry program in 2002.  
Ohio has launched a “Release Preparation Program” 
for all inmates, irrespective of their risk assessment 
levels.  According to a 2003 report by the Urban 
Institute, the program, which starts six months 
prior to an inmate’s release, “includes employment 
readiness and other workshops and seeks to 
provide transitional linkages so that the inmate will 
continue to receive needed services after release.”  
Ohio also has established an Office of Reentry and 
Correctional Best Practices.
In addition, private corrections companies work to 
influence the policy process.  One way they exert influence 
is through campaign contributions; the industry’s leading 
companies donate money to candidates running for public 
office.  In doing so, they exercise a bi-partisan strategy that 
supports incumbents of both parties.  During the 1998 
election cycle, private firms made 1,187 contributions 
to 636 candidates.  Altogether, the industry doled out 
$862,822 in 43 states.  Such donations have generally 
targeted states that make greater use of private prisons.  
The private corrections industry also engages in policy 
advocacy at both the federal and state levels.  Such efforts 
typically feature the use of high-powered lobbying firms.  
In addition, the industry relies upon its relationship with 
the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a 
nonpartisan, Washington, DC-based policy group whose 
membership includes 30 percent of all state legislators.  
During the 1990s, ALEC’s Criminal Justice Task Force 
promoted “get tough” legislation and the increased use of 
private prisons.  
Promising Practices in Rehabilitation and Reentry
Challenges Faced by Inmates
Most inmates will eventually return to society; however, 
ex-offenders face serious obstacles in their quest to “go 
straight” after being released.  Because they often have 
lower levels of educational attainment and poorer job 
skills than the general population, former inmates struggle 
to find work and avoid future criminality.  Former 
inmates also experience difficulties with substance abuse 
and reconnecting with family, and are often greeted by 
communities that offer them little assistance.  In addition, 
scholars have found that few inmates are receiving the 
types of services that they need to ensure success upon 
release.  These challenges are often more daunting for 
racial minorities, as they must also deal with prejudice and 
discrimination.
What Works?
When it comes to recidivism and rehabilitation, the idea 
that “nothing works” continues to enjoy currency in some 
circles.  Yet, analysts have identified a number of effective 
practices that provide some hope for the future.  Many 
of these programs have grown out of the prisoner reentry 
movement.  Researchers suggest that reentry programs can 
be defined as: (1) correctional programs that focus on the 
transition from prison to community, and (2) programs 
that initiate treatment in a prison setting and are connected 
with a community program to provide continuity of care.
Many studies have evaluated the success or failure of prison 
reentry programs by their ability to reduce recidivism rates.  
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• At the same time, however, the measure requires
the closure of Oak Hill Academy, an alternative 
middle and high school for adjudicated, detained, 
and committed youth between the ages of 11 and 
21 years.  In its place, the District will design and 
construct a new smaller facility patterned after the 
Missouri Model, which places and treats young 
people in smaller settings.
• Lastly, the Juvenile Justice Act places greater
emphasis on rehabilitating youth offenders and 
appropriately treating “incompetent juveniles” 
rather than ignoring their deficiencies.
Florida
Orange County Jail, Jail Educational and Vocational 
Program
• Since 1987, the Orange County Corrections
Division has offered intensive educational and 
vocational programming to most of its inmates.  
The county jail has roughly 3,300 beds.
Project Re-Connect
• Established in 1998, Project Re-Connect provides
post-release job placement services to former 
inmates (ages 25 and under) who complete either 
a GED or a vocational program during their 
imprisonment.  Individuals who are eligible for the 
program are identified 30 days prior to their release.
 
• Project Re-Connect also offers referrals for housing,
food, clothing, transportation, medical services, and 
educational programs.
The Establishment of the Office of Program, Transition, 
and Post-Release Services
• Created in 2001, the office offers pre- and post-
release programs.  The pre-release program features 
a 100-hour required transitional course, which 
covers topics such as values clarification, goal 
setting and achieving, problem solving and decision 
making, keeping a job, financial management, 
sexual responsibility, and parenting skills.  For 
post-release programs and services, the state has 400 
beds provided by faith and character transitional 
providers for inmates being released from prison. 
• Additional services include: family development,
victim awareness, anger management, rethinking 
personal choice, distance learning, substance abuse, 
and chaplaincy and volunteer programs.
Ending Prison Construction
• In California, 70 percent of former inmates
return to prison within three years of their release.  
This reality, along with the tremendous cost of 
managing the nation’s second-largest prison system, 
has prompted the state to end its 30-year prison 
construction binge.  As of June 2005, California 
had no prisons under construction and no plans to 
construct new facilities.
The Establishment of the Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation
• With the end of prison construction, lawmakers
contend that they are now placing rehabilitation at 
the center of corrections policy.  As of July 1, 2005, 
the state reorganized its Department of Youth and 
Adult Corrections by launching a new Department 
of Corrections and Rehabilitation.  With this new 
entity, the state’s adult and juvenile justice systems 
no longer work autonomously.
Reorganizing Parole
• California is currently in the process of reorganizing
its parole policies.  Included among the changes are:
– Affording parole agents alternatives to short-
term imprisonment by allowing them to closely 
monitor offenders and divert parolees to drug 
treatment programs or job training classes rather 
than sending them back to prison.
– Expanding the Police and Corrections Team
(PACT) programs to give local law enforcement 
better access to the parole system and to give 
parolees greater access to community services.
Los Angeles County Men’s Central Jail, Social Mentoring 
Academic and Rehabilitative Training (SMART)
• The SMART Program offers health services,
substance abuse treatment, GED courses, anger 
management, and life skills training for gay males 
in the county.  County officials created the program 
in 1999 after discovering that the recidivism rate 
for gay men was higher than that of the general 
population.
The District of Columbia
The Omnibus Juvenile Justice Act of 2004
• Adopted by District lawmakers in late 2004, this
measure blends both the “get tough” and treatment 
approaches to juvenile justice policy.  On the “get 
tough” side, the measure allows judges to order 
parents or caretakers to appear in court with their 
child and to pay up to $10,000 in restitution to 
the victims of their child’s crime.  It also offers 
prosecutors, government agencies, victims, 
and other parties greater access to confidential 
information about youth suspects.  
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once per month.  However, drug testing is increased 
if the offender tests positive.  Program evaluators 
from the University of Maryland found that Break 
the Cycle was effective in reducing drug abuse and 
re-arrest.  
The Correctional Options Program (COP)
• As described in a 2004 report by the Justice Policy
Institute, COP is “a comprehensive program 
of graduated sanctions and services that was 
established as a tool to divert carefully screened 
low-risk, drug-involved offenders from prison.  It 
was designed to safeguard the public; assure that 
offenders are accountable for their actions; provide 
substance abuse, educational, vocational, and 
employment services; and strengthen participants’ 
parenting, daily living, and social skills.”  Analysts 
have found that COP, introduced in 1994, has been 
an effective tool in reducing substance abuse among 
offenders and reducing criminal behavior.
Maryland Division of Correction, Partnerships for Reentry 
Programming (PREP)
• Developed in 2000, PREP acts as an umbrella
for smaller programs, thereby bringing together 
organizations and agencies that help inmates 
develop job skills and secure employment.
Reentry Enforcement Services Targeting Addictions, 
Rehabilitation, and Treatment (RESTART)
• This program will work to coordinate pre-release
services for offenders to prevent recidivism.  It 
connects the state’s programs and services.  
RESTART will be phased in over the next three 
years.  Officials hope to provide a minimum 
of 9,800 units of treatment for inmates.  These 
units will be divided into the following services: 
vocational training/academic instruction, addictions 
treatment, expanded mental health services, 
expanded case management, and pre-release 
programming support.
Michigan
Eliminating Mandatory Minimum Drug Laws
• In December 2002, former Republican Governor
John Engler signed a bill that eliminated mandatory 
minimums for drug crimes.  As reported by the 
Associated Press, the bill “requires judges to follow 
state sentencing guidelines when sending drug 
criminals to prison but gives them more discretion 
by eliminating minimum sentences.”  Prior to 
this change, Michigan was said to have among 
the harshest drug laws in the country.  Moreover, 
former Governor William Milliken—the man 
who signed the drug laws into effect in 1978—was 
Broward County Sheriff’s Office, Day Reporting and Re-
Entry Division
• Established in 2004, this division offers case
management and transitional services to persons 
serving time in the Broward County jail.  It also has 
two specialized tracks: (A) a Community Service 
Work Program for repeat misdemeanants as an 
alternative to jail, and (B) an Aftercare Program for 
successful graduates of the in-custody 90-day boot 
camp.
Georgia
Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles, Results-Driven 
Supervision (RDS)
• Researchers with the Board of Pardons found
that special supervision in four behavioral areas 
(education, substance abuse, employment, and 
cognitive skills) produces significant results in 
deterring crime—even in persons once considered 
“intractable.”  Consequently, since 1997, RDS 
has allowed parole officials to assess each parolee 
under their care to determine weaknesses in the 
aforementioned areas and then create “tracks” of 
short- and long-term goals.  Sanctions are issued if a 
former inmate fails to stay on course.  The program 




• The county received a grant from the Annie
E. Casey Foundation to develop alternatives to 
pretrial detention for youth offenders who are 
not considered dangerous.  Rather than sending 
juveniles to detention facilities, some are spending 
time at youth service centers.  The county’s 
screening process is rigorous and examines an 
offender’s prior arrest record to ascertain if the child 
should be sent to a detention facility.  Alternatives 
to confinement include home-confinement, 
electronic monitoring, and reporting centers.  Since 
1994, the county has cut its detention population 




• According to a 2004 report by the Justice Policy
Institute, with this program, Maryland has 
developed “a form of intensive probation focusing 
on drug treatment, drug testing, and sanctions.”  It 
uses bi-weekly testing for the first two months of 
supervision to detect illegal drug usage.  Testing is 
then reduced to once per week for an additional 
two months.  Thereafter, drug testing is reduced to 
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quoted by the Associated Press as calling the old 
measure “the worst mistake of my career” and 
“an overly punishing and cruel response that 
gave no discretion to a sentencing judge, even for 
extenuating circumstances.”
Michigan Prisoner Re-Entry Initiative
• Established in 2004, this program is based on the
National Institute of Corrections’ Transition from 
Prison to Community Initiative model (TPCI).  
The TPCI model focuses on critical decision points 
such as assessment and classification, supervision, 
discharge from supervision, and aftercare and 
community services.  The Michigan program starts 
with the inmate intake process and continues 
through incarceration and release.  According to 
the Department of Corrections, once the program 
is fully operational, it will involve partnerships with 
the state and local police agencies, academicians, 
community organizations, faith-based 
organizations, crime victims, and other members of 
the public.
Mississippi
The Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2005
• The law creates a new system of community-based
programs for youth offenders as an alternative to 
incarceration.  The measure also seeks to provide 
every county in the state access to programs that 
offer after-school services, family counseling, and 
health care.
New Mexico
New Mexico Corrections Department, Community 
Corrections
• Community Corrections Programs mainly serve
offenders in the community who are considered 
to be at higher risk to re-offend and therefore have 
greater treatment needs.  This initiative also serves 
as a diversionary program for probation/parole 
violators who otherwise would be imprisoned.
New York
New York City Department of Health and Hygiene, New 
York City Link
• Since 1996, New York City Link, a short-term case
management linkage program, has focused on the 
transition from prison to community for offenders 
with serious and persistent mental illnesses.
New York State Division of Probation and Correctional 
Alternatives, TANF for Community Corrections
• Since 2000, this program has issued annual
contracts to 21 community-based organizations 
and local government programs for programming 
that promotes parental skills training, gainful 
employment, and the reduction of recidivism 
among ex-offenders.
Reforming the Rockefeller Drug Laws
• In December 2004, after decades of failed attempts
to change New York’s drug laws, lawmakers finally 
reached a compromise to soften the penalties under 
the Rockefeller Drug Laws.  Under the changes, a 
low-level first-time drug offender would no longer 
be sentenced to 15 years to life for his or her 
offense.  Rather, the prison term would be eight to 
twenty years.  Some activists, including hip-hop 
mogul Russell Simmons, were pleased with the 
reforms.  Critics, however, maintain that lawmakers 
have not done enough to reform the Rockefeller 
Drug Laws, adding that the state’s drug laws were 
still among the toughest in the country.
Texas
Texas Workforce Commission, Project Reintegrating 
Offenders (RIO)
• Established in 1994, Project RIO is administered
by the Texas Workforce Commission in partnership 
with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 
the Windham School District, and the Texas 
Youth Commission.  The objective of the program 
is to provide a connection between educational, 
vocational training, and employment services 
during imprisonment and after release.
Conclusions and Implications
The nation’s youth of color are experiencing a time of 
crisis.  They face daunting challenges to securing a good 
education, finding employment, and becoming productive 
members of society.  If we fail to address these issues, 
millions of young people will be fed into the nation’s 
criminal justice systems.  Policymakers must consider 
changes that will help to transform the urban communities 
in which so many of these young people reside.  The 
following policy recommendations flow from the analysis 
presented in this paper.
The Political Discourse on Crime and Punishment
• Rely on research rather than rhetoric. 
– Weigh the potential intended and unintended
consequences of proposed changes in crime and 
drug policy.
– Consider how racial minorities have been con-
structed as targets of public policy.
• Adopt an approach to criminal justice that balances
the needs of society, victims, and inmates.  
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Truth-in-Sentencing and Three Strikes and You’re Out
• Repeal or revise Truth-in-Sentencing and Three
Strikes laws that have proven ineffective in the fight 
against crime and drugs.
Drugs and Imprisonment
• Rescind the 100-to-1 powder cocaine/crack cocaine
ratio and other drug sentencing laws that have 
incarcerated nonviolent offenders while failing to 
capture “drug kingpins.”
• Divert nonviolent, non-dangerous drug addicts and
offenders from the prison system.
The Private Corrections Industry
• Conduct an audit of private correctional
institutions to determine: (1) the physical conditions 
of the inmate population, (2) the effectiveness of 
inmate rehabilitation programs in these institutions, 
(3) the purported cost-savings of private prisons over 
public institutions.
Juvenile Justice
• Provide family therapy and parent training directed
at delinquents or pre-delinquents and their families.
• Divert nonviolent and non-dangerous juveniles
from confinement.
• Explore rehabilitation options in community-based
programs for youth offenders.
• Increase job opportunities for minority youth.
Rehabilitation and Prisoner Reentry
• Improve alcohol, drug treatment, and ancillary
services for inmates during their incarceration.
• Strengthen education and vocational programs.
• Assist inmates in their re-introduction to society
by putting them in touch with institutions and 
organizations that might be of assistance upon 
release.
• Aggressively recruit private businesses to employ
inmates after they are released from prison.
xi
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1940, Richard Wright introduced America to Bigger 
Thomas in the author’s signature work, Native Son.  Bigger 
is a 20-year-old black male with an 8th grade education.  He 
lives on the south side of Chicago, Illinois, with his mother 
and younger siblings.  The Thomas family suffers through 
economic privation and social isolation, as they share a rat-
infested, one-room apartment in the city’s black belt.  Ms. 
Thomas, the family’s lone wage earner, struggles to support 
three children on an insufficient income.  Bigger, thinking 
about his family’s living conditions, his own life chances, and 
the constraints of race and class in America, says:
Every time I think about it I feel like somebody’s poking a 
red-hot iron down my throat.  Goddammit, look!  We live 
here and they live there.  We black and they white.  They 
got things and we ain’t.  They do things and we can’t.  It’s 
just like living in jail.  Half the time I feel like I’m on the 
outside of the world peeping in through a knot-hole in the 
fence...”1
Ever frustrated by racial divisions, he adds, “Every time I get 
to thinking about me being black and they being white, me 
being here and they being there, I feel like something awful’s 
going to happen to me.”2 
Something terrible does happen to Bigger.  In the final section 
of Native Son, Bigger is sentenced to death row for his crimes 
against white society, offenses that are both real and contrived. 
Bigger’s demise is, in part, a result of his own decisions and 
actions.  Yet, Bigger Thomas is also an American creation—a 
native son, the product of virulent racism, denial of educa-
tional and employment opportunities, and hopelessness.
Racial minorities have made great strides in the U.S. since 
the publication of Native Son.  During the 1950s and 1960s, 
courageous civil rights activists and black organizations led 
assaults against de jure segregation and racism.  After years 
of struggle, their efforts resulted in favorable U.S. Supreme 
Court rulings and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.  These 
judicial and legislative changes offered the nation’s minority 
citizens hope for full inclusion in American life.3 
The quest to gain equal status was far from complete, howev-
er, as the battle for inclusion took on new meaning.4   During 
the next phase of the movement, activists and organizations 
focused on expanding opportunity, access, and equity across a 
number of areas—particularly in the economic realm.  Today, 
blacks trail whites on nearly every measure of socioeconomic 
well-being (Table 1).  Becker, Jones, and Tate note that this 
“has been and continues to be true of all categories of African 
Americans, male and female, young and old, urban and rural, 
married and single, and in every geographical region of the 
country.”5  Much of the same can be said for other minority 
groups, as racial minorities have historically been systemati-
cally relegated to lower stations in American society.6
 Nowhere are these struggles more evident than in the lives of 
youth from communities of color, particularly young males of 
color.  Despite advances during the last several decades, there 
are still millions of boys and young men who find themselves 
in conditions akin to Bigger Thomas.  Many of them face 
daunting challenges in obtaining an education, finding work, 
and becoming productive members of society.
Education is viewed as the great equalizer, and society often 
looks to the school system to solve its problems.7  Yet, high 
school graduation and college preparedness rates for minori-
ties lag behind the rates for white youth.  Nationally, the pub-
lic high school graduation rate remained flat between 1991 
and 2002 (72 percent in 1991 versus 71 percent in 2002), 
although the percentage of students who left public high 
schools with the skills and qualifications necessary to enroll 
in college increased from 25 percent in 1991 to 34 percent in 
2002.8  In 2002, however, while 78 percent of whites gradu-
ated from high school with a regular diploma, only 56 percent 
of blacks and 52 percent of Latinos finished high school with 
Table 1. Wealth and Socioeconomic Well-Being, by Race and Ethnicity.
Measure White Black Latino
Median Family Income (1998) $49,023 $29,404 $29,608
Median Net Wealth, Householders (2000) $79,400 $7,500 $9,750
Homeownership (2002) 74.5% 47.3% 48.2%
Business Ownership, % of all Businesses (1997) 17,782,902 823,499 1,199,896
(85.4%) (4.0%) (5.8%)
Employment Status, Ages 16+ (2004)
Employment Rate 63.1% 57.2% 63.8%
Unemployment Rate 4.8% 10.4% 7.0%
Poverty Rate (2002-03) 10.4% 24.1% 22.1%
Sources: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, DataBank; U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau.
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a regular diploma.   Likewise, while 40 percent of whites left 
high school eligible to pursue a college education, only 23 
percent of blacks and 20 percent of Latinos were ready for 
college.10   
Data on workforce participation offer a similar picture, as 
unemployment rates for black and Latino males are routinely 
higher than the rate for whites.  In 2004, the black unemploy-
ment rate was 10.4 percent, compared with seven percent for 
Latinos and 4.8 percent for whites.  For black males ages 16 
to 19, the unemployment rate was 35.6 percent, in contrast 
to 21.2 percent and 16.3 percent for Latinos and whites, 
respectively (Table 2).  Although unemployment rates in 2004 
decreased for all young men ages 20 to 29, minorities were 
still unemployed at higher rates than their white counterparts.
Americans have differing perspectives regarding the causes 
of economic inequality.  For blacks, inequality is rooted in 
discrimination, whereas whites, and even some Latinos, at-
tribute the differences to the behavior of blacks or some factor 
other than racism.11 Some researchers, focusing on wealth, 
have argued that government policy has impaired the ability 
of minorities to accumulate wealth and that attempts by these 
groups to achieve self-employment through entrepreneurship 
have, for much of the nation’s history, been limited by law.  
While minorities have endured “cumulative disadvantages,” 
whites have had “cumulative advantages.”12  Accordingly, it 
should come as no surprise that, while 55 percent of whites 
believe that all or most of the goals of the civil rights move-
ment have been achieved, only 38 percent of Latinos and 21 
percent of blacks share this view.13   
In this political, economic, and social context, young males of 
color need guidance and support if they are going to success-
fully navigate America’s unsteady racial terrain.  Moreover, a 
change in policy is also needed, as retrenchment of the social 
welfare state and the hardening of criminal justice policies 
have worked to limit the life chances of males from communi-
ties of color.  Otherwise, many will become part of a new gen-
eration of “native sons” that is undereducated, unemployed, 
and unprepared for the challenges that they will face in the 
21st century.  If such children survive into adulthood but fail 
in life, prison is the one institution waiting to receive them.14 
The Prison Crisis: Inside the Numbers
As of 2003, 2.2 million sentenced inmates were held in Amer-
ica’s adult prisons, up from 204,211 in 1973.15  If all persons 
under adult correctional supervision are included, then the 
number of individuals under the watch of the federal or state 
criminal justice systems increases to 6.9 million.16  Between 
1973 and 2003, the incarceration rate grew from 93 inmates 
per 100,000 U.S. residents to 482 inmates per 100,000 U.S. 
residents.  This increase is astounding, especially considering 
that, between 1923 and 1973, incarceration was “strikingly 
stable” at an average rate of 110 inmates per 100,000 U.S. 
residents.17  The increase is particularly puzzling given that 
crime rates fluctuated during the 1980s and then dropped 
each year between 1992 and 2000 (Figure 1).
To contain expanding inmate populations, the number of 
state prisons grew from 592 in 1974 to 1,023 by June 2000.18  
By this date, there were a total of 1,668 correctional facilities 
in the United States.19  While the state and federal govern-
Table 2. Employment Status of the Civilian Population, by Race, Ethnicity, and Age, 2004.
Race/Ethnicity Civilian Non-Institutional 
Population






Not in Labor 
Force
White Males
16 to 19 years 6,429,000 47.4% 39.7% 16.3% 3,379,000
20 to 24 years 8,024,000 82.1% 75.1% 8.5% 1,438,000
25 to 29 years 7,570,000 92.6% 87.6% 5.3% 561,000
Black Males
16 to 19 years 1,195,000 30.0% 19.3% 35.6% 837,000
20 to 24 years 1,326,000 69.9% 55.7% 20.3% 399,000
25 to 29 years 1,121,000 83.6% 73.0% 12.7% 184,000
Latino Males
16 to 19 years 1,336,000 42.4% 33.4% 21.2% 769,000
20 to 24 years 1,981,000 84.4% 76.4% 9.4% 309,000
25 to 29 years 2,097,000 93.1% 87.4% 6.1% 145,000
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat3.pdf and http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat4.pdf. 
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for 45 percent of all male inmates and were incarcerated at a 
rate of 3,405 inmates per 100,000 U.S. residents.  Latino and 
white males were imprisoned at rates of 1,231 per 100,000 
and 465 per 100,000, respectively.  Black men between the 
ages of 25 and 29 had the highest incarceration rate of any 
group: 9,262 per 100,000.  Stated differently, about nine 
percent of all black men between the ages of 25 and 29 were 
in prison at the end of 2003. 
ments operate most of these institutions, private corrections 
companies have designed, constructed, and managed many 
others since the mid-1980s.
Troubling racial disparities are evident inside America’s pris-
ons (Table 3).  Blacks and Latinos represent 26 percent of the 
U.S. population, but comprised 63 percent of all inmates un-
der state or federal custody in 2003.  Black males accounted 
Figure 1. Estimated Property and Violent Crime Rates (per 100,000) of Offenses Known to 
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Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 






















Table 3. Number of Sentenced Prisoners under State or Federal Jurisdiction per 100,000 Residents, by 
Gender, Race, and Age, 2003.*
Number of sentenced prisoners per 100,000 residents of each group
Males Females
Age Totala Whiteb Blackb Latino Totala Whiteb Blackb Latino
Total 915 465 3,405 1,231 62 38 185 84
18-19 597 266 2,068 692 28 15 80 39
20-24 1,996 932 7,017 2,267 112 71 286 138
25-29 2,380 1,090 9,262 2,592 147 99 406 152
30-34 2,074 1,042 7,847 2,440 164 109 456 181
35-39 1,895 1,017 6,952 2,226 170 106 491 209
40-44 1,584 873 5,854 1,995 133 82 386 192
45-54 899 501 3,500 1,329 60 36 190 97
55+ 208 141 747 397 8 5 22 16
*Note: Based on estimates of the U.S. resident population on July 1,
2003, using intercensal estimates for July 1, 2002 (by gender, race, and Latino 
origin) and adjusted to the July 1, 2003 estimates by gender.
(a) Includes American Indians, Alaska Natives, Asians,
Native Hawaiians, and other Pacific Islanders.
(b) Excludes Latinos.
Sources: Harrison and Beck 2004; U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics 2004.
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Racial minorities are also disproportionately represented in 
the nation’s juvenile justice systems.  As of October 27, 1999, 
the latest year for which data are available, there were 134,011 
youth in 2,939 juvenile facilities.21  On any given day during 
that year, minority youth, who make up 34 percent of the 
U.S. juvenile population, accounted for 62 percent of the of-
fenders in residential placement.  Blacks (1,004 per 100,000), 
American Indians (632 per 100,000), and Latinos (485 per 
100,000) all had higher custody rates than whites (212 per 
100,000).
Finally, a greater share of public funds has been committed to 
America’s prison systems.  The federal government increased 
its expenditures on corrections from $541 million in 1982 
to $5.2 billion in 2001, an increase of 861 percent.22  State 
expenditures grew 538.4 percent, rising from $6 million in 
1982 to $38.4 billion in 2001.  Local government spending 
increased as well, rising from about $3 million in 1982 to 
$16.7 billion in 2001 (455.3 percent).
Although states and localities spend more money on other 
functions of government, expenditures have increased at a 
greater rate for corrections than for other functions.23  From 
1977 to 2001, total state and local expenditures on cor-
rections increased by 1101 percent.  This rate of growth 
outpaced spending increases for education (448 percent), 
hospitals and health care (482 percent), interest on debt (543 
percent), and public welfare (617 percent).24 
Overview of the Paper
These trends in imprisonment have led some activists and 
analysts to suggest that America has a “prison-industrial com-
plex” analogous to the military-industrial complex that came 
into view during the 1950s.25  This paper evaluates the impact 
of the prison-industrial complex on males from communities 
of color.  Specifically, it asks the following questions: What is 
the impact of the large increases in the proportion of state and 
local public funds dedicated to corrections?  To what extent 
has the private corrections industry influenced and driven na-
tional, state, and local policy regarding criminal justice policy 
and programs?
To answer these questions, the paper first clarifies the meaning 
of the prison-industrial complex.  It then provides a historical 
overview of trends in the political and intellectual discourses 
on crime and punishment and explores how these ideas influ-
enced the formulation of public policy.  The paper then exam-
ines the development and influence of the private corrections 
industry, followed by a review of the status of minority youth 
in criminal and juvenile justice systems.  Particular attention 
is paid to the following jurisdictions: California, the District 
of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, and Texas.  Given their 
racial and ethnic diversity, what we learn from these jurisdic-
tions can help us to understand more about other states with 
similar racial compositions.26 
The findings of this analysis indicate that the shifting poli-
tics of crime have left an indelible mark on crime and drug 
control policies.  In general, the nation has abandoned the re-
habilitative model in favor of policies that emphasize punish-
ment and incapacitation—even for nonviolent drug offend-
ers.  These policies, enacted on an incremental basis over four 
decades, have contributed to soaring incarceration rates across 
a number of states.  They also have led to sizeable increases 
in the amount of money directed to criminal justice systems.  
Along the way, private corrections companies have worked 
to influence the policy process through campaign contribu-
tions and policy advocacy.  Prisoner abuse and harassment (by 
other inmates and correctional officers), sexual violence, poor 
physical conditions (e.g., overcrowding and failure to protect 
against exposure to inmates with HIV/AIDS), family strain, 
voter disenfranchisement, and private interests profiting from 
the misery of the poor are just some of the social injustices 
generated by these policies.
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The term “prison-industrial complex” was derived from 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s assessment of the U.S. 
military apparatus.27  Some suggest that it is a subgovernment 
comprised of governmental and non-governmental entities 
that produce policies that further expanded prison systems.28   
Although these accounts are partially correct, the prison-in-
dustrial complex is best understood as a hybrid subgovern-
ment/issue network constructed around the issues of crime, 
punishment, and prisons.29 
The prison-industrial complex has features that are indicative 
of both subgovernments and issue networks.30  Like a subgov-
ernment, it has been stable over time and operates in relative 
obscurity.  It also has the attendant members of the “iron tri-
angle” (i.e., congressional committees, executive agencies, and 
interest groups).  Yet, the prison-industrial complex resembles 
an issue network in two important ways.  First, it cuts across 
the federal, state, and local levels of government.  Second, a 
large number of interest groups move in and out of the policy 
arena.  Some groups are part of the federal or state criminal 
justice systems (e.g., correctional officer unions, law enforce-
ment agencies, prosecutors), while others operate outside of 
these systems (e.g., single-issue interest groups, victims’ rights 
associations, communities in which prisons are situated).  
Some groups wield influence at the national level while others 
are more effective at the lower levels of government.  
The prison-industrial complex should not be viewed as an all-
powerful replacement to the military-industrial complex, as 
there are significant differences between the two.  First, mili-
tary service generally improved the employability of soldiers; 
in contrast, as Wray observes, “With the near abandonment 
of attempts to rehabilitate or educate prisoners, it is unlikely 
that most prisoners leave prison better prepared for employ-
ment.”31  Second, the military-industrial complex was almost 
exclusively powered by the national government, which can 
deficit-spend.  The prison-industrial complex, by compari-
son, is largely an undertaking of state and local governments, 
which must balance their budgets.32  Third, military Keynes-
ianism consumed the products of the highest technology 
firms.  In contrast, the prison-industrial complex is largely 
“low tech” and “blue collar,” consuming fewer products from 
companies such as Boeing or Lockheed Martin as the mili-
tary-industrial complex did.33 
Evidence for the Existence of the Prison-Industrial 
Complex
A number of factors provide strong evidence for the existence 
of the prison-industrial complex.  First, as a result of soaring 
inmate populations and the ensuing boom in prison con-
struction, America sits alone as the global leader in imprison-
ment (Figure 2).  Absent from the list of the world’s leading 
incarcerators are countries with which the U.S. is most often 
compared—industrialized nations such as Great Britain (141 
inmates per 100,000 residents), Germany (98 per 100,000), 
France (93 per 100,000), and other members of the European 
Union.34  Also missing are countries with dubious human 
II. DEFINING TERMS: UNDERSTANDING
THE AMERICAN PRISON-INDUSTRIAL 
COMPLEX
Figure 2. The Top Ten—Prison Population Rate






















Source: Walmsley 2003. 
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rights records, such as Iran (226 per 100,000), China (117 
per 100,000), and Syria (93 per 100,000)—nations with 
which the U.S. prefers not to be compared.
Second, several businesses appear to have placed themselves 
in a position to profit from prison growth.  Merrill Lynch and 
Goldman, Sachs & Company are among the many firms that 
vie to underwrite prison construction projects with private, 
tax-exempt bonds.35  Others, such as Correctional Medical 
Services, provide medical care to inmates.  MCI and AT&T 
compete to provide telephone services to prisons.  Still others 
generate profits by providing goods and services to prisons.  
Many of these groups are secretive about their actions because 
they do not wish to attract competition or scrutiny.36 
Third, companies have tapped prisons for labor.  Inmates 
make everything from bulletproof vests and missile cables to 
office furniture and blue jeans.37  Most prison industry pro-
grams can only sell their products to tax-supported agencies, 
nonprofit organizations, and religious groups.  Yet, because 
inmates are poorly compensated (some wages are as low as 
$0.25 per hour per inmate), prison labor has been contracted 
or subcontracted to many companies, including AT&T, 
Boeing, Compaq, Dell, Honeywell, IBM, Microsoft, Target, 
Texas Instruments, and Victoria’s Secret.38  Some companies, 
including Dell and Microsoft, stopped using inmate labor 
after such arrangements were publicized.39  In Dell’s case, the 
company stopped using prison labor following complaints 
by customers and environmentalists regarding inmate safety 
conditions and low wages (between $0.20 and $1.26 per 
hour per inmate).40  Even so, the federal government, through 
Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (also known as UNICOR), 
generated more than $666.8 million in total sales in 2003.41   
60 Minutes once referred to UNICOR as the “Bloomingdale’s 
of prison industries.”42 
Fourth, private corrections firms have emerged as actors in 
American prison systems.  While private prisons held only 
95,522 total inmates in 2003, they were a growing sector of 
the industry from the 1980s through the mid-1990s.43  In 
2003, private facilities held 12.6 percent of federal prisoners 
and 5.7 percent of all state inmates.  Six states detained at 
least 25 percent of their inmates in private institutions (New 
Mexico, 44 percent; Alaska, 31 percent; Montana, 29 percent; 
Oklahoma and Wyoming, both 26 percent; and Hawaii, 25 
percent).  The states with the highest number of inmates con-
fined in private facilities included Texas (16,570), Oklahoma 
(6,022), Tennessee (5,049), Georgia (4,589), and Florida 
(4,330).  The Wall Street Journal dubbed private prisons a 
“theme stock” or hot pick of the 1990s.44  Yet, despite the 
growth in private prisons, the industry has cooled since the 
late 1990s.45  The private corrections industry is explored in 
more detail later in this paper.
Finally, the prison-industrial complex has facilitated note-
worthy developments regarding the location of prisons.  In 
the past, citizens often opposed proposals to place prisons in 
their towns.  Although some communities continue to express 
opposition, others pursue prisons with the zeal exhibited by 
major cities courting professional sports teams.  This has espe-
cially been the case in states like California, Florida, Missouri, 
New York, Ohio, and Texas.  For some, prisons are appealing 
because they offer an environmentally clean industry that can 
bring “recession-proof” jobs, development, and even federal 
funds based on U.S. Census counts.46  These anticipated ben-
efits may be slow to develop, however—if they ever develop at 
all.47 
In summary, prisons have become the centerpiece of a new 
sub-economy.  Now a multi-billion dollar industry, there are 
trade shows, Internet websites, catalogues, and direct-market-
ing campaigns dedicated to corrections.48  The federal and 
state governments, corporations, small businesses, private cor-
rections companies, and rural communities all seem to have 
placed themselves in positions to benefit from prison expan-
sion.  Although it emerged in earnest during the 1980s and 
exploded during the 1990s, the prison-industrial complex has 
it roots in the 1960s.  During that time, crime became a na-
tional concern and anxious citizens demanded governmental 
action.  Since that time, some elected officials and issue-seek-
ing politicians have used crime to get votes and win office.49   
These developments had significant ramifications for crime 
and drug control policy, punishment, and prisons.
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III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: THE 
SHIFTING POLITICS OF CRIME
Most social scientists agree that crime is a complex problem.  
Since the mid-1960s, the politics of crime have been just as 
convoluted.  Prior to 1964, crime was an issue for states and 
localities.  Even today, crime is ostensibly the responsibil-
ity of state and local agencies.50  Yet, since 1964, the public 
has looked to the national government to combat crime.  
The Republican Party, which long rallied against “big gov-
ernment” and championed devolution, has fought for the 
federal government to assume a larger role in fighting crime.  
Meanwhile, Democrats have tried to shed the “soft on crime” 
label by developing policy proposals that appeal to the types 
of voters that left the party in the 1980s.51  Presidents from 
both political parties also have encouraged the states to adopt 
stricter crime and drug policies, sometimes offering financial 
assistance in return for compliance.  Finally, we have seen the 
decline of the rehabilitative model, as criminal justice policies 
now emphasize deterrence, incapacitation, and punishment.
The 1960s: The Rise of “Law and Order”
Presidential politics placed crime on the national agenda.  
In 1964, against the backdrop of the civil rights and anti-
Vietnam war movements, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) 
called for “law and order.”  He described crime as a “growing 
menace” that ensued from a decline in morals and discipline, 
which were beyond the reach of social programs.52  When 
articulating his views, Goldwater mixed race, civil rights, law-
lessness, and other emotionally charged issues.53  His policy 
recommendations included more police power, tougher laws, 
and a less permissive court system. 
While his bid for the presidency was unsuccessful, Goldwater 
offered future Republican candidates a blueprint for winning 
elections.  The campaign demonstrated that conservatism 
provided Republicans with an ideological way to appeal to 
whites who were opposed to racial integration, without the 
risk of being branded as racists.54  It also showed that race 
could be used to shatter the class base of the New Deal coali-
tion among white voters, forcing a philosophical shift to the 
right within a group once committed to the redistributive 
and progressive economic agenda of the New Deal.55  Lastly, 
Goldwater’s campaign established that the crime issue reso-
nated with Americans and potentially could be used against 
Democrats.56  By May 1965, 41 percent of Americans said 
that they would like to see the government devote most of its 
attention to reducing crime, which placed this issue second 
only to improving public education.57  By March 1968, 
Americans identified crime and lawlessness as the nation’s 
most important domestic problem.58
The federal government was thus thrown into crime fighting 
as a result of Goldwater’s efforts (Appendix 1).  President Lyn-
don Johnson, adhering to the liberal perspective, believed that 
crime was a symptom of ills such as poverty, lack of educa-
tion, and lack of opportunity.  His administration emphasized 
extensive research to diagnose the root causes of crime.59  It 
also favored targeted treatment through social programs.  The 
fear-stricken American public, however, demanded action 
after they were incited by Goldwater and Alabama governor 
George Wallace.60 
Beginning in 1965, the Johnson administration took steps 
to confront crime.  The main results of the administration’s 
efforts were the creation of the Office of Law Enforcement 
Assistance (OLEA), which provided financial and technical 
assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies, and the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which 
continued the trend of federal financial support to states and 
localities.61  Johnson’s war on crime failed to produce great 
results, as violent and property crime rates increased each 
year between 1964 and 1968 (Figure 1).  Nevertheless, nearly 
every president since Johnson has attempted to battle crime in 
some way.
The 1970s: “The Crime Problem”—Declining 
Public Concern
As a presidential candidate in 1968, Richard Nixon also 
campaigned on “law and order.” 62  As America’s first “law 
and order” president, Nixon redirected the nation’s policy 
priorities away from the “war on poverty” and toward a full-
fledged “war on crime.”63  He believed that crime was the 
result of individual failings and was best combated through 
punishment.64  The administration targeted organized crime, 
violent offenses, drugs and drug trafficking, and pornography.  
Despite his commitment to devolution in other policy areas, 
Nixon’s crime and drug control policies continued to extend 
the reach of the national government.65 
Nixon’s legislative legacy includes the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act of 1970, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act of 1970, and the Omnibus Crime Control 
Act of 1970 (Appendix 1).  The Organized Crime Control 
Act authorized block grants to state and local law enforce-
ment agencies to fight organized crime.  The Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act reinstated America’s 
“war on drugs.”66  The third piece of legislation, the Omnibus 
Crime Control Act, was intended to boost levels of federal 
support to state and local police agencies through the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).  It reautho-
rized the activities of LEAA and increased its capacity to offer 
technical and financial assistance to the states.  The law also 
increased the share of the cost of crime programs that might 
be covered by federal funds from 60 percent to 75 percent.  
In the process, it required that 20 percent of LEAA funds be 
spent on corrections.67 
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After rising for a number of years, crime rates decreased 
slightly at the end of Nixon’s first term (Figure 1).  Yet, he did 
not have the opportunity to continue his anti-crime crusade.  
Instead, Nixon resigned following the Watergate scandal.  As 
he left office in August 1974, public concern about crime 
waned.  By October 1974, Americans identified inflation, not 
crime, as the nation’s most important issue.68  In this context, 
legislative activity on crime and drugs slowed during the 
administrations of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter.  Although 
Congress enacted some measures during the terms of these 
presidents, they were not commensurate to the policies of the 
Johnson and Nixon administrations.
Thinking about Rehabilitation and Crime—
Growing Intellectual Interest
Despite declining public interest, crime and punishment gar-
nered the attention of scholars during the 1970s.  Two major 
contributions stand out.  First, in 1974, sociologist Robert 
Martinson published an article titled “What Works?—Ques-
tions and Answers about Prison Reform.”  After evaluating 
over 200 studies of rehabilitation that assessed education 
and vocational training programs, counseling, institutional 
environment, medical treatment, sentencing, and “decarcera-
tion,”69 Martinson concluded that the research offered little 
reason to hope that recidivism could be reduced through 
rehabilitation.70  It was later found that the article suffered 
from a number of flaws and offered insufficient evidence for 
its conclusions.71  Even so, the notion that “nothing works” 
appealed to both liberals (protesting injustice) and conserva-
tives (bemoaning permissiveness).  The idea gained significant 
traction within conservative political and intellectual circles 
during the next two decades.  As Sarre observes, “The irony 
was that Martinson thought his well-publicized skepticism 
about rehabilitation would empty most prisons, since prison-
ers could not be reformed.”72  Martinson’s findings were not 
interpreted in this way, however; rather, they were used to jus-
tify and support policies that he did not specifically endorse 
in his article.
Then in 1975, James Q. Wilson published Thinking About 
Crime.  He rejected the idea that crime was the result of 
socioeconomic factors, a notion that informed policymaking 
throughout the 1960s.  Moreover, Wilson believed that the 
liberal and conservative perspectives on crime were indefen-
sible.  Liberals denied that crime rates were rising, recom-
mended more funding for social programs if crime was on the 
rise, or suggested that inmates be rehabilitated in community 
settings rather than in prisons.  Conservatives, on the other 
hand, suggested that supporting local police, impeaching al-
legedly ultra-liberal members of the U.S. Supreme Court, ap-
pointing a tougher Attorney General, and reinstating capital 
punishment would solve the crime problem.  When thinking 
about crime, Wilson stressed morality and individual account-
ability.73 
“Predatory crime” was Wilson’s central concern because he 
believed that such offenses, committed for financial gain, 
stifled the creation and maintenance of community.74  He 
also believed that a decline in adherence to community norms 
had translated into a substantial increase in predatory crime.  
This was especially the case in inner cities controlled by the 
“underclass”75 and persons who had no interest, or who faced 
“special disabilities,”76 in creating and maintaining a sense of 
community.  His analysis devoted considerable attention to 
the criminal activities of young black males.
Wilson’s main conclusions can be summarized as follows:
• Rehabilitation has not worked with serious offenders
• Broad social investments and programs have done
little to change crime rates
• Punishment is a “worthy objective” for a liberal
democratic society
• Deterrence and incapacitation are effective
• New crime control policies ought to be pursued
In sum, Wilson endorsed the increased use of incarcera-
tion to combat crime, particularly if policies targeted repeat 
offenders.  He also recommended the adoption of uniform 
sentencing standards.  Wilson later acknowledged, however, 
that incapacitation could not be the sole purpose of criminal 
justice systems because “…if it were, we would put everybody 
who has committed one or two offenses in prison until they 
were too old to commit another.”77 
Wilson’s research has been both praised and criticized, and his 
importance to the public discourse on crime and drug policy 
cannot be discounted.  As a result of his work, along with that 
of Martinson, the direction of criminal justice policy changed. 
New policies emphasized victims’ rights, determinate sen-
tencing, and punishment rather than rehabilitation.  Such 
ideas served as the foundation for policies enacted during the 
presidential administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. 
W. Bush.  At the same time, the liberal perspective on crime 
was fading.78 
The 1980s: The Resurgence of the Crime 
and Drug Wars
Crime and lawlessness again attracted national attention 
during the 1980s.  This time, however, the introduction of 
crack-cocaine sparked a new anti-drug episode.79  Politicians 
and activists urged America’s children to “just say no,” while 
proposing stiff penalties for alleged drug kingpins.  They also 
called for the expansion of state and federal prison systems 
and the adoption of harsher crime and drug control policies.
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The crime policies of the Reagan and George H. W. Bush 
administrations were guided by four principles.  First, there 
were no social causes of crime.  Second, government programs 
could not solve the crime problem.  Third, criminal justice 
systems were too soft on criminals.  Lastly, criminal justice 
systems should distribute swift justice and longer prison 
terms.  All and all, their approach may be summarized by two 
words: “get tough.”80 
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986, and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1988 were the toughest measures enacted during the Reagan 
and Bush administrations (Appendix 1).81  The Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act overhauled federal sentencing by 
establishing a sentencing commission to develop and recom-
mend sentences for federal offenses.  It also created manda-
tory minimum sentences for repeat offenders, increased the 
maximum fines for serious drug offenders, and gave federal 
prosecutors the authority to seize the assets of drug dealers.  
This law was considered the most sweeping crime policy since 
the Safe Streets Act of 1968.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 was drafted in response to 
the advent of crack.  The most controversial aspect of the law 
was the “100-to-1” ratio, which created the following penalty 
structure for first-offense cocaine trafficking:
Hence, a person convicted of trafficking five grams of crack 
would receive a mandatory minimum prison sentence of five 
years in prison.  A five-year sentence would also be issued for 
trafficking 500 grams of powder cocaine.  Likewise, a person 
caught with 50 grams of crack would receive a mandatory 10-
year minimum term, while it took five kilograms of powder 
cocaine to receive a mandatory 10-year minimum sentence.  
The creation of the 100-to-1 ratio was a deliberate act on the 
part of the executive branch and Congress, as both institu-
tions considered crack to be the leading drug menace in 
America.  As a result, for any amount of cocaine, trafficking 
offenses involving crack are now considerably more severe 
than those involving drugs such as powder cocaine.82  This 
aspect of the law reflected a severity similar to the drugs laws 
enacted in New York State during the early 1970s.
The third policy, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, was 
intended to be tougher than its predecessor.  The 1988 law 
created an even greater distinction between crack cocaine 
and other illegal drugs such as powder cocaine.  For instance, 
it targeted drug addicts by establishing stiffer penalties for 
simple possession of drugs for personal use.  According to the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, crack became the only drug 
with a mandatory minimum penalty for a first-time offense 
of simple possession of a controlled substance.83  Possession of 
more than five grams of crack became punishable by at least 
a five-year prison term.  A five-year minimum sentence was 
established for persons caught with three grams of crack who 
had a prior record of possession.  The same sentence was ap-
plicable to persons who were found with one gram of crack in 
their possession but who also had two or more prior convic-
tions for possession.
Lastly, the 1988 law aimed to reduce the demand for drugs 
through drug treatment and prevention programs and to cut 
the international trafficking of illegal drugs.  To achieve these 
objectives, it established the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy (ONDCP).  The new agency was to be headed by a 
cabinet-level director who came to be known as the national 
“drug czar.”  
Crimes rates fluctuated during the presidencies of Reagan and 
George H. W. Bush (Figure 1).  Drug arrests, however, sharp-
ly increased after the adoption of the harsher crime and drug 
control policies, which led to higher rates of incarceration for 
drug-related offenses (Figures 3 and 4, following page).  By 
the close of the decade, the national incarceration rate was 
276 inmates per 100,000 residents of the population, up from 
139 per 100,000 in 1980.  The prison population grew from 
315,974 in 1980 to 680,907 by 1989.  America was entering 
a different era of punishment.
By the end of the Reagan and Bush administrations, it was 
clear that America had not won the war on crime.  While 
both presidents talked a great deal about violent crime, 
drugs, and problems in the nation’s inner cities, their policies 
were ineffective in the fight to decrease crime rates.  In some 
instances, Reagan actually decreased funding to some crime 
programs.84  Nevertheless, the outlook of Reagan and Bush 
on these issues became pervasive in an environment in which 
liberals were struggling to rearticulate their vision in the ab-
sence of movement-based politics.  Without movement-based 
politics, the time was ripe for punitive and corporate beliefs to 
dominate the views of both political parties.
The 1990s: New Democrats, Old Solutions
Although they had emerged in the 1980s, the “New Demo-
crats” experienced a coming-out party in 1992.  One of their 
own—Arkansas Governor William Jefferson Clinton—came 
out of nowhere to become president of the United States.85   
The New Democrats were the creation of the Democratic 
Leadership Council, which wanted the party to be perceived 
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as more attuned to the concerns of white middle-class voters 
and business interests.86  To do so, the DNC nudged the party 
to the center of the political spectrum, which meant that less 
emphasis was placed on issues of race.87
e Clinton administration’s approach to crime policy was 
tempered by the president’s status as a New Democrat.  On 
one hand, Clinton advocated the placement of more police 
officers on the streets, supported tougher federal sentences, 
and endorsed capital punishment.88  On the other hand, he 
did address the roots causes of crime, although he did not 
sound like a liberal Democrat.  In discussing the rise of vio-
lent crime in American cities, he remarked, “the reason a lot 
of these things are happening is that there has been a simulta-
neous decline of work, family, and community, the things that 
really organize life for all the rest of us.”89  Clinton maintained 
that, in order to properly address the crime problem, all of its 
causes had to be addressed.  In January 1994, after prompting 
from public officials and the media, public concern over crime 
was at its highest level in 20 years, with 37 percent of Ameri-
cans saying that it was the nation’s most important problem.90 
e $30 billion Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994 was the centerpiece of the administration’s war 
on crime (Appendix 1).  It federalized two popular sentencing 
reforms that emanated from the states.  First, it authorized 
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federal assistance to states for prison construction, provided 
that they adopted Truth-in-Sentencing reforms requiring 
inmates to serve 85 percent of their court-imposed sentences 
before being released.  Second, the act nationalized “Three 
Strikes and You’re Out,” a measure that targeted three-time 
serious offenders.  Lastly, the act designated 60 new offenses 
punishable by the federal death penalty, toughened penal-
ties for juvenile offenders, and established new penalties for 
certain street gang activities and drug crimes.  
Interestingly, Clinton enjoyed something that no other presi-
dent had ever experienced in the fight against crime: crime 
rates decreased each year during every year of his administra-
tion (Figure 1).  Yet, the trend began nearly two years before 
the Violent Crime Act became law.  Also, while crime rates 
declined during the Clinton years, prison figures did not.  The 
incarceration rate grew to 469 per 100,000 residents in 2000, 
up from 359 per 100,000 in 1993.  The inmate population 
increased 42.8 percent over this period, growing to 1,331,278 
in 2000.
Summary: Making Sense of It All
At the end of the day, the politics of crime and punishment 
took another turn during the 1990s.  Coming out of the 
1970s, the positions of the major political parties on these 
issues were fairly clear.  The Republicans were the “law and 
order” party, while Democrats stressed the “root causes” 
of crime.  By the end of the 1990s, however, such partisan 
delineations were obsolete, as both Democrats and Republi-
cans called for tougher policies.  The result was a “punishment 
frenzy” largely supported by issue-seeking members of both 
political parties.91 
The intellectual discourse on crime and drug policy con-
tinued to produce scholarship that endorsed the greater use 
of incarceration as a tool in the fight against crime—be the 
offenders adults or youth.  For instance, in 1995, John J. 
DiIulio wrote an article for The Weekly Standard titled “The 
Coming of the Super-predators.”  He described super-preda-
tors as a “demographic crime bomb” of young people who 
kill at will.  He added that super-predators are more likely to 
be black, male, and young, and to come from the central city 
and suffer “moral poverty.”  The definition of moral poverty is 
to be surrounded by “deviant, delinquent, and criminal adults 
in abusive, violence-ridden, fatherless, Godless, and jobless 
settings.”92  DiIulio, along with former and current drug czars 
William J. Bennett and John P. Walters, further clarified the 
theory of moral poverty in Body Count: Moral Poverty—and 
How to Win America’s War Against Crime and Drugs.  They 
dismissed other explanations for criminal activity, such as 
destitution, lack of education, lack of opportunity, or racism.  
According to these authors, the true culprit was abject moral 
poverty, which promoted “lack of impulse control and lack of 
empathy.”93   
As a result of moral poverty and changing demographics, it 
was predicted that, by 2000, there would be “at least 30,000 
more murderers, rapists, and muggers on the streets” who 
“fear neither the stigma of arrest nor the pain of imprison-
ment.”94  The increased use of incarceration was a necessary 
and proper means of dealing with this menace to society.  
Bennett, DiIulio, and Walters also recommended that religion 
be used in the war on crime.  Other researchers, including 
analysts at the National Center for Policy Analysis and the 
Heritage Foundation, offered similar perspectives and policy 
recommendations.95 
The mass media quickly picked up this terminology and poli-
cymakers began to call for new anti-crime and juvenile justice 
initiatives.96  Shortly thereafter, these ideas were codified into 
law with new policies that targeted violent and repeat offend-
ers.  Likewise, between 1992 and 1997, 47 states and the 
District of Columbia adopted laws that made their juvenile 
justice systems more punitive.97  The much anticipated crime 
wave, however, never materialized and young people actually 
contributed to declining crime rates during the 1990s.98 
In the final analysis, other scholars were more accurate in their 
assessments of crime policy.  For instance, some researchers 
noted that ideas about the so-called underclass were driving a 
“new penology” that emphasized “low-cost management of a 
permanent offender population.”99  Others argued that, with 
the wars on crime and drugs, police adopted more aggres-
sive tactics when patrolling black and Latino communities.100   
Such practices—powered by a racialized fear of crime—ex-
acerbated racial disparities in arrests, jailing, and impris-
onment.101  Still, some plainly remarked, “the conceptual 
building blocks of the conservative rhetoric on crime and its 
control were fallacious.”102  These analyses, however insightful, 
were not heeded.  Thus, lawmakers must be wiser consumers 
of policy research in the future.
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IV. KEY THEMES IN ADULT AND
JUVENILE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
POLICY
Oftentimes, public policies are first formulated and imple-
mented at the state level.  If deemed successful, a state law is 
then adopted by the federal government.  Truth-in-Sentenc-
ing (TIS) and Three Strikes are examples of this type of policy 
development.  They were driven, in part, by horrific incidents 
involving repeat offenders that attracted national attention 
and public anger.103  This section discusses TIS and Three 
Strikes laws, as well as their impact on incarceration rates 
and males from communities of color.  It then turns to drug 
sentencing and the private corrections industry.
Truth-in-Sentencing
The Truth-in-Sentencing movement unfolded during the 
1960s and 1970s.  It was driven by public frustration with 
judges, “indeterminate sentencing,” parole boards, and the 
perception that criminal justice systems were growing too 
lenient.  Under indeterminate sentencing, judges tailored sen-
tences for offenders by assessing each individual’s entire crimi-
nal record and personal history.  After reviewing an inmate’s 
file, the judge would set a broad term of imprisonment—for 
example, five to ten years.  Later, parole boards had the power 
to release an inmate before the full sentence had been served.  
Historically, such arrangements were intended to provide 
incentives for “good behavior” in prison and “to encourage 
inmates to make progress toward parole release plans.”104 
As with any system, however, mistakes were made.  Anecdotes 
emerged detailing the exploits of violent criminals who were 
released from prison only to strike again.  A movement for 
“determinate sentencing” soon developed, which emphasized 
deterrence, incapacitation, and swift and certain punishment.  
Under determinate sentencing, an offender could estimate his 
or her actual prison term by taking the sentence length set by 
the judge and subtracting credits expected for pretrial deten-
tion and/or good behavior in prison.105  After years of deter-
minate sentencing, however, some states faced crowded prison 
systems and court orders to address unsatisfactory conditions.  
It was at this time that Truth-in-Sentencing laws emerged.
Truth-in-Sentencing laws are structured to guarantee that 
offenders serve a substantial portion of their court-imposed 
sentences before they are released.  Policies that reduce the 
amount of time served by inmates, such as credits for good 
behavior, are either restricted or eliminated by TIS.  Although 
TIS laws vary from one state to the next, most jurisdictions 
target violent offenders.106  Supporters of TIS maintain that 
it reduces crime by confining hardcore, habitual violators to 
prison.  
Table 4. Truth-in-Sentencing Laws across the States.a






AZ (525) LA (801) OH (391) AK (401) MD (420) AL (635)
CA (455) ME (149) OK (636) AR (476) MT (233) HI (325)
CT (389) MI (489) OR (354) CO (430) NE (228) NM (314)
D.C.b MN (155) PA (330) ID (427) NH (188) RI (184)
DE (501) MO (529) SC (551) IN (370) NV (462) SD (393)
FL (463) MS (768) TN (433) KY (392) TX (702) VT (226)
GA (539) NC (348) UTc (240) MAd (233) WS (392) WV (260)
IA (290) ND (181) VA (472) WY (372)
IL (342) NJe  (314) WA (260)
KS (334) NY (339) Average 
Incarceration Rate 
= 339
Average Incarceration Rate = 414 Average Incarceration Rate = 394
(a) Incarceration rates for sentenced inmates at yearend 2003 in parentheses.  
(b) Since December 31, 2001, as a result of the National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Act of 1997, the District of
Columbia no longer operates a prison system.  The District’s sentence inmates have been absorbed into the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons.
(c) According to its applications to the Corrections Program Office, Utah’s TIS policy is not codified in statute, but it is accepted as TIS
by the federal government.
(d) The incarceration rate includes an estimated 6,200 inmates sentenced to more than one year but held in local jails or houses 
of corrections.
(e) Includes some inmates held in local jails sentenced to one year or less.
Sources: Sabol et al. 2002; United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics 2004.
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TIS laws were first implemented in Washington State with 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981.  In 1994, the Violent 
Crime Control Act authorized $10 billion in federal assistance 
for states to develop, expand, or improve correctional facili-
ties and programs to ensure prison space for violent repeat 
offenders.  By 2002, 42 states and the District of Columbia 
had adopted some variation of Truth-in-Sentencing (Table 4).  
Eleven states, including Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Mis-
sissippi, and New York, adopted TIS laws in 1995, one year 
after President Clinton’s crime bill became law.107 
 
In addition, eight states eliminated parole board release dur-
ing the same year that they adopted TIS.108  Altogether, 16 
states abolished early release by discretion of a parole board 
for all offenders.109  This is not surprising given that, among 
the states that received federal TIS grants, no state adopted 
TIS laws without implementing at least one other reform that 
increased either the certainty or the severity of punishment of 
(at least) violent offenders.110 
Many parole boards have retained discretionary power over 
inmates sentenced for crimes committed prior to the aboli-
tion of parole board release.  Connecticut, Colorado, and 
Florida re-established the equivalent of parole boards after 
finding that abolition did not necessarily increase actual time 
served by all inmates.  Indeed, prisons in these states became 
so crowded following the elimination of parole boards that a 
number of inmates had to be released early.111  Parole advo-
cates argued that the abolition of parole board release was 
a political slogan that did not translate into more effective 
punishment.112 
Evaluating the Impact of TIS Laws
In 1995, the Corrections Program Office was established 
within the U.S. Department of Justice to implement the cor-
rectional grant programs created by the Violent Crime Act 
of 1994.  Available funds for formula grant awards were split 
evenly between Violent Offender Incarceration (VOI) grants 
and TIS Incentive grants.  VOI funds were distributed based 
on a three-tiered formula.113  Eligible states received funding 
under any or all of the three tiers.  
TIS funds were available only to states with laws requiring 
that a violent offender serve no less than 85 percent of the 
court-imposed sentence—a key qualification under President 
Clinton’s plan.  Otherwise, states had to demonstrate that the 
combined impact of their policies increased the percentage of 
violent offenders sent to prison, increased the time served by 
violent offenders, and ensured that repeat violent or drug of-
fenders served at least 85 percent of their terms.114  VOI/TIS 
funds were first allocated in fiscal year 1996.  No state could 
receive more than 25 percent of the total funds available un-
der the TIS program.115 
Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia met the fed-
eral requirement of 85 percent at some point between 1996 
and 1999.  In addition, according to the General Accounting 
Office, 15 of the 27 states that were eligible for TIS grants 
in 1997 admitted that the availability of federal funds was at 
least a partial factor in adopting the law.116  Government rep-
resentatives in Louisiana, Maine, New York, and Oklahoma 
indicated that potential federal aid was a key factor in the 
decision to implement TIS.  
Several states, however, chose not to enact TIS laws that met 
the federal requirement.  Officials in sixteen states—including 
Illinois, Maryland, and New Mexico—suggested that prison 
construction and/or operating costs would be too high if their 
states adopted the federal requirement.117  Other states, Texas 
among them, indicated that their sentencing practices were 
working well.118 
Twenty-one states, including Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, 
and New York, received VOI/TIS grants under the criteria 
established by the Violent Crime Act of 1994.119  Of the states 
with indeterminate sentencing, five received awards based on 
assessments of sentencing and release guidelines.120  As of July 
2000, 38,000 prison beds had been provided by VOI/TIS 
grants.121  More than 6,500 beds were added to juvenile facili-
ties.  According to the Department of Justice, however, the 
typical TIS award would build only fifty prison beds, as the 
estimated average grant from 1996 to 1998 ($7,885,875) was 
about one percent of the average annual corrections expendi-
tures.122 
As of fiscal year 2000, although all states and U.S. territories 
received federal aid, only $2.3 billion of the $10 billion ap-
propriated for VOI/TIS grants had been allocated.123  Ten of 
the eleven jurisdictions under review in this paper received 
grants that exceeded the national median in grant amount 
during fiscal year 2000 (Table 5, following page).  All eleven 
jurisdictions exceeded the national median in the total pro-
gram award from 1996 to 2000.  Thus, while the grants were 
small, some jurisdictions secured more grant dollars than oth-
ers.  California, Florida, and New York, three of the nation’s 
four largest prison systems, led all states in total program dol-
lars, taking in a combined 32 percent of the funding awarded.
The RAND Corporation conducted an extensive review 
of VOI/TIS grants, examining their effect on crime rates, 
incarceration rates, prison admission rates, time served, and 
correctional budgets.124  The researchers cautiously noted that 
the full impact of VOI/TIS programs might not be discern-
able for many years.  The early findings are summarized on 
the following page.
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Crime Rates
• The lowest violent crime and property crime rates
were for those states without TIS laws.
Incarceration
• Incarceration rates in TIS and non-TIS states have
increased over time.  The most dramatic increases 
have occurred in TIS states and non-TIS states with 
indeterminate sentencing.  Non-TIS states with de-
terminate sentencing increased their felony incarcera-
tions per 1,000 crimes from 429 in 1986 to 510 in 
1996.  TIS states with indeterminate sentencing saw 
their rates rise from 313 in 1986 to 626 in 1996.
Prison Admission Rates
• Since 1994, TIS states have had a higher percentage
of prison admissions for violent crimes than non-TIS 
states.  This relationship held both for determinate 
and indeterminate sentencing models.  This suggests 
that TIS may be associated with steady admissions to 
prison, especially for states with determinate sentenc-
ing.
Sentences Imposed, Time Served
• Irrespective of the offense, the number of sentences is
slightly lower in TIS states than non-TIS states.
• Nationally, the imposed maximum sentence length,
the average length of prison term, and the percent of 
term served for violent crimes increased in TIS states 
between 1993 and 1997.
• Time served for all offenses has increased nationwide
since 1993.  
• Historically, time served for TIS states has been lower
than that in non-TIS states.
• Historically, non-TIS states have had larger
percentages of time served for violent and property 
crimes, although not for drug offenses.
• Percent of sentences served has increased for all
states, but most sharply for TIS states, consistent with 
the intent of TIS.
Correctional Budgets
• In general, TIS states spend more money per 1,000
persons on corrections expenditures.  Likewise, TIS 
states spend more on prison construction than non-
TIS states.  In 1996, however, there was a significant 
increase in prison construction spending for non-TIS 
states.
• Greater spending by TIS states may reflect the fact
that these jurisdictions historically have experienced 
higher crime and incarceration rates than non-TIS 
states.
In closing, the RAND researchers criticized the VOI/TIS 
program for applying a “one-size-fits-all approach” to criminal 
sentencing: “All states, no matter how tough their current sen-
tencing practices, were encouraged (by the qualifying condi-
Table 5. Violent Offender Incarceration/Truth-in-Sentencing Awards, Selected States.
State FY 1999 FY 2000 Program Total (FY 1996-2000)
California* $67,506,416 $59,925,242 $349,372,723
District of Columbia* 4,521,350 3,704,340 21,289,476
Florida* 41,204,384 36,997,672 199,730,195
Georgia* 14,704,207 13,318,483 68,445,729
Illinois* 29,972,621 26,005,262 99,206,239
Maryland 6,341,191 5,072,449 26,689,423
Michigan* 18,793,213 17,113,398 91,420,709
Mississippi 4,846,096 4,211,642 25,090,523
New Mexico* 6,772,254 5,127,031 22,260,754
New York* 34,714,181 31,938,353 184,340,401
Texas 12,588,646 10,205,690 56,189,629
Grand U.S. Total** $484,792,694 $423,830,679 $2,274,996,860
Median, U.S. $4,407,392 $3,816,358 $20,012,320
Median, Above Jurisdictions $14,704,207 $13,318,483 $68,445,729
* Indicates FY 2000 Truth-in-Sentencing States.
** Figure includes allocations to American Samoa, Guam, the North Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Corrections Program Office n.d.
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tions of the grants) to increase the fraction of their convicted 
violent offenders who were sent to prison, the length of their 
sentence, and the amount of time they served.”125  Therefore, 
these authors conclude, policymakers must subject future 
sentencing reforms to greater scrutiny before codifying them 
into law.
Although it may be some time before analysts can determine 
the full impact of TIS laws, one thing is already clear: because 
minorities are overrepresented in the prisons, they are likely to 
be disproportionately affected by any surge in prison admis-
sions and incarceration (Table 6).
Three Strikes and You’re Out
Between 1993 and 1996, 24 states and the federal govern-
ment added Three Strikes legislation to their existing sentenc-
ing laws.126   For many states, the policy was the latest install-
ment in a series of measures intended to lengthen prison 
terms for violent and repeat offenders.  The objective of Three 
Strikes was clear: persons repeatedly convicted of serious 
offenses should be removed from society for long periods of 
time or, in some cases, permanently.127 
Supporters of Three Strikes argued that it protected citizens 
by incapacitating the worst criminals.  They added that the 
law would save taxpayer dollars by preventing crime, elimi-
nating direct losses to victims, and avoiding the expense of 
processing the same offenders through the justice system 
multiple times.  Across the states, victims’ rights groups were 
among the most vocal advocates for the measure.  Single-issue 
interest groups, such as the National Rifle Association, offered 
financial support for Three Strikes legislation.128  Critics, how-
ever, predicted that Three Strikes would overburden criminal 
justice systems with defendants seeking trials to stave off life 
imprisonment.  Detractors also suggested that the measure 
would exacerbate conditions in already crowded prison sys-
tems.129 
Although many states have adopted Three Strikes laws, there 
are variations in the provisions and in the legislation and its 
implementation (Table 7, following page).  First, there are 
different definitions of what constitutes a “strike.”  Violent 
crimes, such as murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated 
assault, are considered strikes in most jurisdictions.  Some 
states also include charges such as the sale of drugs (Indiana), 
drug offenses punishable by imprisonment for more than five 
years (Louisiana), the sale of drugs to minors (California), 
the ritual abuse of a minor (Montana), escape from prison 
(Florida), and embezzlement and bribery (South Carolina).  
In California, juvenile adjudication of a serious or violent 
felony can potentially count as a strike.130 
Table 6. Number of Sentenced Prisoners under State or Federal Jurisdiction per 100,000 Residents, by Race, Selected
States, 1980 and 2000.
Number of sentenced prisoners per 100,000 residents of each group.
White Black Latino American Indian Asian
State 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000
California 57 299 435 2,308 115 505 145 767 20 44
D.C. 38 145 587 1,809 158 220 541 453 29 731
Florida 123 239 749 1,630 76 236 53 364 10 37
Georgia 125 282 490 1,139 47 83 26 463 11 35
Illinois 47 127 400 1,550 71 291 205 508 17 22
Maryland 56 119 626 1,172 83 451 179 291 13 50
Michigan 72 247 749 1,370 200 1,810 171 473 3 37
Mississippi 74 260 257 1,315 34 165 82 532 13 82
New Mexico 95 159 720 1,908 143 397 30 179 27 64
New York 48 96 469 1,278 240 768 58 515 8 36
Texas 111 411 674 2,710 156 551 162 717 37 126
Federal 9 19 38 149 4 118 37 106 2 21
U.S. 78 235 551 1,815 139 609 233 709 30 99
Source: “Incarceration Atlas,” Mother Jones—Debt to Society (2001), http://www.motherjones.com/news/special_reports
prisons/atlas.htm (accessed June 19, 2005).
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Table 7.  Comparison of Three Strikes Laws with Preexisting Sentencing Provisions, Selected States.















CA Life with no parole 
eligibility before 20 years 
for 3rd violent felony 
conviction where separate 
prison terms were served 
for the first 2 convictions; 
life without parole for 4th 
violent felony conviction.
1994 Mandatory doubling 
of sentence for any 
felony if one prior 
serious or violent 
felony conviction; 
mandatory life 
for any 3rd felony 
if 2 prior serious 
or violent felony 
convictions.
Any felony if 1 prior 
felony conviction 
from list of strikeable 
offenses.
2 Mandatory 
sentence of twice 
the term of the 
offense involved.
FL Categories of habitual 
felony offender and 
habitual violent offender; 
range of enhanced 
sentences.
1995 Added new category 
of ‘violent career 
criminal’ to existing 
Habitual Offender 
statute; for 3rd 
conviction for 
specified violent 
offense, life if 1st 
degree felony, 30-40 
years if 2nd degree 
felony, 10-15 years 
for 3rd degree felony.
Any forcible felony, 
aggravated stalking, 
aggravated child abuse, 
lewd or indecent 
conduct, escape.
3 Life if 1st degree 
felony, 30-40 
years if 2nd degree 
felony, 10-15 
years for 3rd 
degree felony.
GA Upon 4th felony 
conviction, offender 
must serve maximum 
time imposed, and not 
be eligible for parole 
until maximum sentence 
served.
1995 Mandatory life 









2 Mandatory life 
without parole.
MD Same law, except that 
carjacking and armed 
offenses were not on the 
list of offenses receiving 
this sentence.
1994 Life without parole 
for 4th violent felony 
conviction for which 
separate prison terms 
were served for the 
1st three.
Murder; rape; robbery; 
1st or 2nd degree 




of firearm in felony; 
assault with intent to 





for first three 
strikes.
Mandatory life 
in prison with no 
parole eligibility.
NM Mandatory increased 
sentence of 1 year upon 
2nd felony conviction, of 
4 years upon 3rd, and 8 
years upon 4th or more.
1994 Mandatory life with 
parole eligibility 
after 30 years for 
3rd conviction for 
violent offense.
3 Mandatory life in 
prison with parole 
eligibility after 30 
years.
Source: Austin et al. 1999; Clark, Austin, and Henry 1997.
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There also are differences across states in terms of the number 
of strikes needed for an offender to be “out”—or, in this case, 
“in.”  Three strikes are required in most jurisdictions; however, 
Arkansas, California, Georgia, Kansas, Montana, Pennsylva-
nia, South Carolina, and Tennessee enhance sentences for of-
fenders with two strikes (depending on the offense).  In South 
Carolina, any person convicted for a second “most serious 
offense” is sentenced to life without parole.131
Finally, states vary in their definition of what it means to 
“strike out.”  Twelve states—including Georgia and Mary-
land—impose mandatory life sentences without the pos-
sibility of parole when a person has “struck out.”132  Three 
other states consider parole only when a prisoner has served a 
substantial portion of his or her sentence: inmates in Califor-
nia must serve a minimum of 25 years to qualify for release; 
in New Mexico, inmates are considered for parole only after 
serving 30 years in prison; and in Colorado, prisoners are 
eligible for parole after serving 40 years. 
Evaluating the Impact of Three Strikes
Despite predictions that Three Strikes legislation would 
overburden criminal justice systems, most measures have been 
symbolic; all of the Three Strikes jurisdictions had pre-exist-
ing laws that enhanced prison sentences for repeat offend-
ers.133  Most statutes, therefore, were not designed to have a 
significant effect on criminal justice systems.  California and 
Georgia are the noteworthy exceptions to this observation.  
According to one team of researchers, of the 21 states for 
which Three Strikes data were available, 14 had incarcerated 
fewer than 100 persons.134  In addition, no state outside of 
California or Georgia had more than 400 persons in prison 
under Three Strikes.135 
California is the most exceptional case because, as Schiraldi, 
Colburn, and Lotke explain, “any felony offense can trig-
ger a Three Strikes sentence.”136  With just 35 million state 
residents, California has incarcerated roughly four times as 
many people under its Three Strikes law (42,322 offenders) 
than all of the other states combined (10,624), even though 
those states have a combined population of 112 million.137  In 
addition, data from the California Department of Corrections 
reveal that, by the end of 2004, 62 percent of those sentenced 
under Three Strikes laws were imprisoned for nonviolent of-
fenses.138  African Americans (6.7 percent of the state popu-
lation) and Latinos (32.4 percent) were heavily represented 
among the state’s two- and three-strike offenders.  Together, 
African American and Latino males accounted for 67 percent 
of all two-strikers and nearly 70 percent of all three-strikers in 
California.  More than 11,000 racial minorities were commit-
ted to the state prison system from Los Angeles County alone.
In Georgia, as of June 2005, there were approximately 7,000 
inmates in the state’s prison system as a result of its Two 
Strikes law.  Of these persons, about 70 percent were black 
and 10 percent were Latino.  Blacks and Latinos accounted 
for 28.7 percent and 5.3 percent of the overall state popula-
tion, respectively.  Of all the offenses for which persons can be 
sentenced under the Georgia Two Strikes law, armed robbery 
was the most frequent (comprising about half of the total).139
 
In closing, the current political environment may be unre-
ceptive to abolishing or revising Three Strikes laws.  In states 
across the nation, prosecutors, victims’ rights groups, correc-
tional officer unions, and single-issue politicians have formed 
an “alliance for penal severity” that considers Three Strikes 
as “iconic orthodoxy.”140  In assessing the political legacy of 
Three Strikes, some researchers have concluded that it trans-
formed the public discourse into a zero-sum game between 
victims and offenders—the prevailing assumption being that 
anything that is harmful for offenders must be beneficial to 
victims.  Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin observe, “Instead of 
calculating costs and benefits, all a citizen must do is choose 
sides.”141  Other analysts have argued that Three Strikes is an 
example of what can go wrong when citizens have too much 
influence over public policy.  This was especially the case in 
California, where the Three Strikes bill, which was crafted by 
a citizen, “received almost no analytic attention from either 
criminal justice professionals or academic experts prior to 
enactment.”142 
Drugs and Imprisonment
The invention of crack-cocaine during the 1980s launched 
the U.S. into a new anti-drug crusade.  During that decade, 
the most significant policies that were adopted by the national 
government were the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.  Tougher anti-drug laws, how-
ever, were implemented in some states as early as the 1970s.  
For instance, in 1973, New York adopted the Rockefeller 
Drug Laws, which required judges to impose a sentence of fif-
teen years to life for a person convicted of selling two ounces 
of drugs or possessing four ounces of drugs.143  The amount 
of crack-cocaine required to produce a 15-year sentence was 
lowered during the 1980s.144  Although the Rockefeller Drug 
Laws were revised in December 2004, they are still among the 
toughest anti-drug laws in America.145  Today, all states have 
some type of mandatory sentencing provision that targets 
drug offenders.146 
Drug arrests have increased significantly since the onset of the 
crack-induced war on drugs (Figure 3).  In 1985, 718,600 
adults and 92,800 juveniles were arrested for drug offenses.  
Four years later, 1,247,800 adults and 113,900 juveniles were 
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arrested for drug crimes.  Although adult and juvenile drug 
arrests have fluctuated in recent years, they have not fallen 
below their 1986 levels.
With regard to incarceration, the number of inmates in prison 
for drug crimes grew from 38,000 in 1985 to 120,100 in 
1989 (Figure 4).  As of 2001, drug crimes represented the 
most serious offense for 246,100 state prisoners.  Some of the 
states under review for the current study witnessed sizeable in-
creases in the number and percentage of inmates imprisoned 
for drug offenses (Table 8).
In addition, felony sentencing data for 2002 revealed that, na-
tionally, blacks represented 36 percent of all persons convicted 
for drug possession and 47 percent of all persons sentenced 
for drug trafficking.147  Other racial groups, such as American 
Indians, Asians, and persons of mixed heritage, accounted 
for just two percent of persons convicted for drug offenses.  
These numbers are striking when one considers patterns of 
illicit drug use in America.  In 2001, 12.2 percent of blacks 
reported using an illicit drug during the course of the previous 
year.  Rates were highest for American Indians (21.9 percent), 
followed by whites (12.9 percent), Latinos (11.9 percent), and 
Asians (6.2 percent).148 
Thirty years ago, the Rockefeller Drug Laws served as a na-
tional model of policy innovation.  More recently, however, 
policy analysts and criminal justice professionals alike have 
concluded that such laws have failed to produce the desired 
effects.  In New York, former Corrections Commissioner 
Thomas A. Coughlin III observed, “The people doing the big 
time in the system aren’t the people you want doing the big 
time.”149  He added that sophisticated drug dealers, mindful 
of the laws, often employ low-ranking workers to bear the risk 
of being caught with drugs.  Thus, high- and mid-level deal-
ers have typically escaped prosecution.  Instead, nonviolent 
addict dealers and low-level “foot soldiers” have inundated 
New York’s prison system.150  When such persons are arrested, 
others are willing to take their positions.  Despite these facts, 
self-serving government officials and office-seeking politi-
cians have used “get tough” policy platforms to win votes and 
advance their careers.151 
Today, some researchers and legal professionals are working 
to move the nation’s policymakers in a different direction.  
For instance, in Washington State, the King County Bar 
Association is urging state lawmakers to rethink the war on 
drugs.  In particular, the Association’s Drug Policy Project 
is supporting policy proposals that reduce crime and public 
disorder, improve public health, better protect children, and 
better utilize scarce public resources.  The group’s specific 
recommendations include: increasing the scope and effective-
ness of drug treatment programs; expanding access to drug 
treatment; broadening treatment opportunities to include 
health care, work-readiness and vocational training, literacy 
training, housing, and peer and adult support networks; and 
Table 8. Number and Percent of Drug Offenders under State or Federal Jurisdiction, Selected States, 1980, 1990, 1999.
1980 1990 1999












California 1,778 8 23,853 25 45,455 28
D.C. NA NA NA NA NA NA
Florida 1,289 6 10,074 23 11,439 18
Georgia 755 6 3,657 17 6,725 17
Illinois NA NA 4,725 17 11,397 26
Maryland NA NA 2,168 13 4,419 20
Michigan NA NA NA NA NA NA
Mississippi NA NA NA NA NA NA
New Mexico NA NA NA NA 986 21
New York 1,983 9 18,459 34 22,266 30
Texas 2,326 8 9,194 18 27,983 20
Federal 4,749 23 25,037 50 60,399 55
U.S. 23,749 8 173,637 23 292,784* 23*
*Data are for 1998.
Source: “Incarceration Atlas,” Mother Jones—Debt to Society (2001), http://www.motherjones.com/news/special
reports/prisons/atlas.htm (accessed June 19, 2005).
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drug education programs based on sound, scholarly research.  
Most of all, the King County Bar Association argues that state 
lawmakers should no longer rely upon the criminal justice 
system as the primary response to drug abuse.152 
In summary, the collective impact of Truth-in-Sentencing, 
Three Strikes and You’re Out, and drug sentencing reforms 
is as follows: (1) more people are going to state and federal 
prison, (2) inmates are serving longer sentences, (3) the Amer-
ican prison population is growing older, and (4) corrections 
costs and expenditures are rising.  Members of racial minori-
ties have been disproportionately affected by “get tough” 
policies (Table 6).  These developments have had a deleterious 
impact on these groups, as the families of prisoners and their 
communities feel the “collateral effects” of the wars on crime 
and drugs.153 
The Private Corrections Industry
During the 1980s and 1990s, states faced mounting demands 
for new prisons to accommodate bulging inmate popula-
tions.  Some responded by building more government-owned 
and government-operated prisons.  Others, however, turned 
to the private sector to secure desperately needed space as 
quickly as possible.  Some states, such as Texas and California, 
pursued both options.  As a result, private corrections compa-
nies emerged as significant actors in adult incarceration and 
juvenile detention.
Private businesses have long contracted with governments to 
provide maintenance, food, health care, education, vocational 
training, and counseling services to prisons.  Over the last 20 
years, however, private companies have become more active in 
the areas of adult and juvenile confinement.  Some firms have 
been hired to manage public prisons, while others have rented 
prison beds in their own facilities on a per diem basis.  Some 
states have even employed private groups to transfer inmates 
to other jurisdictions, where the prisoners are then placed in 
private prisons.  One of the largest areas of activity has been 
the contracting of private firms to design, build, and operate 
privately owned correctional facilities.  Such public-private 
prison partnerships have attracted both scrutiny and prompt 
debate.154 
Political support for privatization swelled during the 1980s 
as part of a larger critique of “big government” and the social 
welfare state.  The idea emerged that contracting private 
organizations for delivery of services, including correctional 
services, was superior to direct government provision.155  
Advocates of privatization argued (and continue to argue) that 
private firms are more efficient than the state due to the lack 
of bureaucratic encumbrances, especially in the area of labor 
relations.  Many believe that private firms increase quality 
and flexibility, reduce costs, and offer innovation in the face 
of competition.156  By 1995, there were 110 private adult 
prisons in the U.S. with a rated capacity of 19,294.157  Five 
years later, there were 264 private facilities with a total capac-
ity of 105,133.  In addition, there were 1,794 private juvenile 
custody facilities in 1999.158
Opponents of prison privatization have maintained that 
contracting with private companies necessitates the improper 
delegation of governmental power into private hands.  Crit-
ics often add that private corrections companies place profit 
above the public interest, inmate concerns, and the rehabilita-
tive purposes of imprisonment.  Moreover, it is argued that 
private facilities do not offer the range of inmate services cov-
ered by the state.  Lastly, critics have cited inadequate train-
ing of correctional officers, escapes, and lack of government 
oversight as reasons to be wary of prison privatization.159
 
The nation’s largest private prison firms are the Corrections 
Corporation of America (CCA) and the Geo Group, Inc. 
(formerly known as the Wackenhut Corrections Corpora-
tion).  CCA, based in Tennessee and incorporated in 1983 
as the nation’s first private prison company, is the industry’s 
leader.  In 2001, the capacity of its facilities under contract in 
the U.S. was 62,231, representing a 52 percent share of the 
American private prison market.  Federal correctional and 
detention authorities accounted for more than 35 percent of 
the firm’s total sales.160  Today, CCA is the sixth-largest cor-
rectional system in the country.
The Geo Group, Inc. (GGI) is an offshoot of the Wackenhut 
Corporation, a well-established Florida security firm.  GGI 
is the nation’s second-most prominent private corrections 
company.  Like CCA, GGI provides facility design, construc-
tion, and financing for clients who are building new prisons.  
In 2001, the capacity of GGI facilities under contract in the 
U.S. was 26,704 beds, a 22 percent share of the domestic cor-
rections market.  Aside from CCA and GGI, several smaller 
companies compete for the remaining segment of the U.S. 
corrections market.161 
The private corrections industry ran into difficulty during 
the late 1990s.  First, some research studies raised questions 
regarding the ability of private prison facilities to deliver cost-
savings while others plainly concluded that they were no more 
cost-effective than public prisons.162  Second, the industry’s 
leading companies were marred by allegations of inmate 
abuse, misclassification of inmates, riots, escapes, and deaths.  
For example, at a CCA facility in Youngstown, Ohio, an 
inmate from the District of Columbia was stabbed to death 
in a brawl over a hip-hop tape.  Less than three weeks later, 
another inmate from the nation’s capital was murdered while 
being escorted to his cell.  In all, there were nineteen stab-
bings at the prison between May 1997 and March 1998.163
 
In addition, there were numerous disturbances in New 
Mexico, a state that once flirted with the idea of privatizing 
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Table 9. State and Federal Prisoners in Private Prisons and Local Jails, Selected Jurisdictions, 2003.
Private Prisons Private Local Jails
State # of Inmates % of all inmatesa # of Inmates % of all Inmatesa
California 3,507 2.1 2,415 1.5
D.C.b --- --- --- ---
Florida 4,330 5.4 48 0.1
Georgia 4,589 9.7 4,949 10.5
Illinois 0 0 0 0
Maryland 122 0.5 234 1.0
Michigan 480 1.0 42 0.1
Mississippi 3,463 14.9 4,724 20.4
New Mexico 2,751 44.2 0 0
New York 0 0 1 0
Texas 16,570 9.9 13,331 8.0
Federal 21,865 12.6 3,278 1.9
State 73,657 5.7 70,065 5.4
U.S. Total 95,522 6.5 73,343 5.0
(a) Based on the total number of inmates under state or federal jurisdiction.
(b) Since December 31, 2001, as a result of the National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Act of 1997, the
District of Columbia no longer operates a prison system.  The District’s sentence inmates have been absorbed into the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons.
Source: Harrison and Beck 2004.
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its entire adult prison system.  In November 1998, a supervi-
sor at the GGI-managed Lea County Correctional Facility 
ordered guards to take a belligerent inmate down with “a 
thump.”  The supervisor then ordered the guards to cover 
up the incident.164  In April 1999, 150 inmates at the prison 
rioted and trapped two counselors inside their offices.  In all, 
thirteen guards were injured.165  Later, in August 1999, an 
inmate wielding a laundry bag filled with rocks killed another 
prisoner at the Guadalupe County Correctional Facility, also 
a GGI prison.  The following week, a guard was killed in 
another riot at the same institution.  During the mêlée, an 
inmate was stabbed and at least two others were injured.166   
Altogether, four prisoners and one guard were killed in these 
prisons between November 1998 and September 1999.167  
As a result of these and other events, states such as Arkansas, 
North Carolina, and Utah withdrew from some agreements 
with private correctional facilities.168 
Today, 6.5 percent of all sentenced inmates and five percent of 
local jail inmates are held in private correctional institutions 
(Table 9).  Some states have made greater use of private facili-
ties than others.  New Mexico has sent a larger percentage 
of its inmates (44 percent) to private prisons than any other 
state.  Texas leads the nation with 16,750 sentenced inmates 
in private prisons.  Georgia (4,589 inmates) and Florida 
(4,330) are also in the top five nationwide.
The federal government, perhaps more so than any other 
jurisdiction, has been the savior of the private corrections 
industry.  During the last few years, private corrections com-
panies have secured lengthy and lucrative contracts with the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons and other agencies of the national 
government.169  Since December 2000, while the number of 
state inmates in private facilities has, in fact, decreased by 1.8 
percent, the number of federal inmates in private institutions 
has increased by more than 40 percent.170  Some companies, 
through their political activities, have worked to ensure that 
these practices continue.
The Political Activities and Influence of the 
Private Corrections Industry
In general, private corrections companies work to influence 
the policy process in two ways.  First, they donate funds to 
candidates running for public office.  Such donations typically 
target states that make greater use of private prisons or deten-
tion facilities.  For instance, during the 1998 election cycle, 
the private corrections industry made 1,187 contributions 
to 636 candidates.171  Altogether, these companies doled out 
$862,822 in 43 states.  California led all states with dona-
tions totaling $285,996.  Although this amount may seem 
miniscule, one analyst observed, “Consider that the average 
amount needed to elect a representative in many states is 
about $5,000.  And Senate seats go to candidates who raise 
Table 10. Private Prisons and Campaign Contributions in the South, 2000 Election Cycle.
State and Year # of Checks # of Recipients Total to Candidates Total to Parties
Texas 323 156 $361,293 $9,500
North Carolina 590 107 226,519 5,150
Florida 381 122 158,485 34,722
Louisiana (1999) 90 56 71,455 6,300
Virginia (1999) 191 92 63,454 10,700
Georgia 150 84 56,650 15,500
Tennessee 110 44 52,631 6,000
Oklahoma 131 54 52,125 2,050
Mississippi 75 37 41,085 1,000
Arkansas 182 61 26,125 500
Kentucky (1998-2000) 21 14 8,350 5,010
Alabama (1998) 2 1 4,500 0
West Virginia 2 1 2,000 0
South Carolina 1 1 925 0
Overall Total 2,249 830 1,125,598 96,432
Source: Bender 2002.
less than $20,000 in some states.  So $250, $500, and $1,000 
contributions are meaningful.”172 
Campaign contributions by private corrections companies 
are especially generous in the South, a region where states 
have made greater use of incarceration (Table 10).  During 
the 2000 election cycle, private firms donated $1.1 million 
to 830 candidates in fourteen southern states.  An additional 
$96,432 was distributed to party committees or caucuses.  
In both the 1998 and 2000 election cycles, private prison 
companies exercised a bipartisan strategy by contributing to 
both Republicans and Democrats.  Rather than acting solely 
on ideology, they chose to back incumbents.  As Bender 
notes, “By strategically timing its contributions, the industry 
was able to ensure that a larger percentage of its money went 
to candidates who were all but certain to win, thereby im-
proving their odds for access during upcoming public policy 
debates.”173 
Second, private corrections companies engage in policy 
advocacy at the federal and state levels of government.  For 
instance, during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on 
Truth-in-Sentencing, a high-ranking official from the Geo 
Group, Inc. commented, “By passing ‘truth-in-sentencing’ 
laws, states have begun to restore a fundamental sense of 
justice and fairness to our system of crime and punishment.”  
He added, “At the same time, they have taxed their own abili-
ties and challenged some old-fashioned ideas about prisons.  
Prison privatization has developed in direct response to those 
challenges.”174  Some members of the private prison indus-
try are genuinely concerned about public welfare.  It is only 
natural to note, however, that for-profit prisons also have a 
material interest in criminal justice policies that promote the 
increased use of adult incarceration and juvenile detention as 
crime control strategies.
The private corrections industry participates in other forms 
of policy advocacy as well.  Some firms work with high-pow-
ered lobbying firms and public policy groups to advance their 
interests.  For example, over the past few years, CCA and 
GGI have retained the services of the following lobbyists: 
The Bloom Group; Wise & Associates; Patton Boggs; Eck-
ert, Seamans, Cherin & Mellott; Garry Smith & Associates; 
McBride-Mahr; Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell; and 
Arter & Hadden.  While private corrections companies have 
employed lobbyists to promote and protect their interests, 
however, it is difficult to discern the cost of such activities.175 
Finally, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) 
guides some of the political activities of the private corrections 
industry.  ALEC is a nonpartisan, Washington, DC-based 
policy group whose membership of 2,400 includes 30 percent 
of all state legislators.  The organization also counts cur-
rent and former governors and congresspersons as alumni.176   
Since the early 1970s, ALEC has provided lawmakers with 
model bills crafted around a number of issues.  It has also 
been closely aligned with conservative political actors and 
private corrections corporations.177 
During the 1990s, ALEC’s Criminal Justice Task Force 
promoted “get tough” crime control legislation and prison 
Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies Health Policy Institute

privatization.178  In 1994, the task force played a significant 
role in fashioning and advancing in the states a policy agenda 
that included the following:
• Implementing Truth-in-Sentencing laws;
• Implementing Three Strikes laws;
• Keeping dangerous defendants off the streets by
allowing judges to deny bail, end pre-trial release, and 
require secured bail for violent and habitual offenders;
• Treating juveniles as adults for serious crimes;
• Allowing juveniles’ criminal histories to be considered
by the courts;
• Guaranteeing the rights of victims to seek redress
and restitution; and
• Using privatization, electronic home detention,
boot camps, and other methods to determine efficient 
systems of punishment.
ALEC has enjoyed some success, as some of these policies 
have been adopted by several states.  In the process, the pri-
vate corrections industry has benefited from its relationship 
Table 11. Changes in Juvenile Justice Systems across the States, 1992-1997.
State Changes in Law or Court Rule State Changes in Law or Court Rule
Alabama T C Montana T S C
Alaska T C Nebraska
Arizona T S C Nevada T C
Arkansas T S C N. Hampshire T S C
California T C New Jersey S C
Colorado T S C New Mexico T S C
Connecticut T S C New York
Delaware T S C North Carolina T C
D.C. T S North Dakota T C
Florida T S C Ohio T S C
Georgia T S C Oklahoma T S C
Hawaii T C Oregon T S C
Idaho T S C Pennsylvania T C
Illinois T S C Rhode Island T S C
Indiana T S C South Carolina T C
Iowa T S C South Dakota T
Kansas T S C Tennessee T S C
Kentucky T S C Texas T S C
Louisiana T S C Utah T C
Maine C Vermont
Maryland T C Virginia T S C
Massachusetts T S C Washington T C
Michigan S C West Virginia T C
Minnesota T S C Wisconsin T S C
Mississippi T C Wyoming T C
Missouri T S C
T = Transfer provisions—Laws made it easier to transfer juvenile offenders from the juvenile justice system to the criminal justice
system (45 jurisdictions).
S = Sentencing authority—Laws gave criminal and juvenile courts expanded sentencing options (31 jurisdictions).
C = Confidentiality—Laws modified or removed traditional juvenile court confidentiality provisions by making records and
proceedings more open (46 jurisdictions).
Source: Snyder and Sickmund 1999.
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with ALEC.  Thus, although private corrections companies 
have lost business in some states, the federal government has 
proven to be a valuable client to the industry.
Juvenile Justice
In the late 19th century, American juvenile justice systems 
were established on the principle that children lacked the 
capacity to make adult decisions.179  By the early 20th century, 
juvenile justice systems were seeking to transform delinquent 
offenders into productive members of the society through 
treatment.180  With the decline of the rehabilitative model, 
however, newer policies and practices have stressed detention 
to ward off the rise of alleged super-predators.  This attack 
of the super-predators did not come to pass.  In 2002, the 
juvenile violent crime arrest rate was at its lowest level since 
1980.181  Even so, given the heightened concern over crime 
and delinquency, the “get tough” movement targeted juvenile 
justice systems for transformation.
From 1992 to 1997, forty-seven states and the District of 
Columbia approved measures that made their juvenile justice 
systems more punitive (Table 11).  Specifically, these jurisdic-
tions made it easier to transfer juveniles to adult criminal jus-
tice systems, gave criminal and juvenile courts expanded sen-
tencing options, and changed or removed traditional juvenile 
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Table 12. Number of Juveniles in Custody per 100,000 Residents, by Race, October 27, 1999.
Custody rate per 100,000 residents of each group.
State of 
Offense




White Black Latino American
Indian
Asian
U.S. 212 1,004 485 632 182 MO 146 554 161 265 145
AL 208 588 249 314 93 MT 148 1,463 614 652 704
AK 281 612 421 799 290 NE 220 1,552 744 1,648 290
AZ 234 957 473 293 125 NV 305 1,019 312 511 249
AR 139 575 137 0 256 NH 150 1,278 578 0 0
CA 269 1,666 623 612 238 NJ 70 1,108 327 0 6
CO 257 1,436 719 789 223 NM 211 1,011 520 257 111
CT 160 2,143 1,243 518 196 NY 169 1,119 143 466 34
DE 203 1,143 304 0 0 NC 123 466 152 238 123
DC 173 855 369 0 0 ND 204 1,136 544 1,187 847
FL 306 964 200 202 87 OH 221 1,038 430 112 75
GA 273 878 163 861 72 OK 194 821 297 343 56
HI 39 87 90 0 121 OR 353 1,689 478 1,074 270
ID 203 871 344 278 173 PA 123 1,230 902 154 249
IL 152 1,005 271 590 37 RI 155 1,363 680 0 474
IN 280 1,260 370 168 46 SC 244 772 50 293 421
IA 240 1,726 545 1,231 465 SD 436 2,908 1,091 1,653 1,235
KS 239 1,691 642 612 295 TN 170 576 132 0 91
KY 192 1,030 133 0 182 TX 204 965 391 140 96
LA 223 1,127 290 249 139 UT 267 1,043 692 946 366
ME 166 390 272 332 0 VT 93 698 0 0 0
MD 136 575 131 0 12 VA 225 1,024 323 166 104
MA 93 648 806 0 232 WA 232 1,507 323 827 249
MI 243 1,058 1,112 428 215 WV 166 1,060 251 0 292
MN 183 1,504 630 1,783 459 WI 164 1,965 725 845 398
MS 118 300 3,454 0 13 WY 396 2,752 847 939 482
Note: The custody rate is the number of juvenile offenders in residential placement on October 27, 1999, per 100,000 juveniles age 10 through the upper age of 
original juvenile court jurisdiction in each state.  U.S. total includes 2,465 juvenile offenders in private facilities whom state of offense was not reported and 174 
juvenile offenders in tribal facilities.
Source: Sickmund 2004.
court confidentiality provisions by making juvenile records 
and proceedings more open.182  By the end of 1997, juvenile 
records in most states could be released to prosecutors, law 
enforcement agencies, social agencies, schools, victims, and/or 
the public.  Some states even added “purpose clauses” to their 
juvenile justice codes.  Such statements generally stressed ac-
countability, deterrence, protecting the public from criminals, 
victims’ rights, and punishment—the same values that were at 
the center of the political and intellectual discourses on adult 
corrections policy.  Racial minorities have been greatly af-
fected by these changes; numerous studies of disproportionate 
minority confinement have found that race can influence the 
processing of youth.183 
Analysis of arrest rates reveals that juvenile arrests dispropor-
tionately involve racial minorities.  In 2002, the violent crime 
arrest rates for black (736 per 100,000 residents of the popu-
lation) and American Indian (200 per 100,000) juveniles were 
higher than the rate for whites (196 per 100,000).184  The 
black arrest rate was nearly 3.5 times greater than the rate for 
whites and seven times greater than the rate for Asians (95 per 
100,000).  Data for property crimes show similar disparities, 
with higher arrest rates for blacks (2,448 per 100,000) and 
American Indians (1,347 per 100,000), compared with whites 
(1,308 per 100,000).
There are also racial disparities in juvenile justice systems, 
where minority youth are overrepresented at various decision 
points in these systems.185  On any given day in 1999, minor-
ity youth, although just 34 percent of the general juvenile 
population, accounted for 62 percent of all juveniles held in 
residential placement.  Likewise, racial minorities were over-
represented in nearly every juvenile justice system in the U.S. 
(Table 12, previous page).  Blacks, American Indians, and La-
tinos each had higher custody rates than whites.  With regard 
to offense, minority youth accounted for seven out of every 
10 juveniles held in custody for violent offenses.  Black youth 
alone represented 55 percent of the juveniles held for robbery 
and 65 percent of those held for drug trafficking (Table 13).




Total White Black Latino American
Indian
Asian
Total 100% 38% 39% 18% 2% 2%
Delinquency 100 37 40 19 2 2
Criminal 
Homicide
100 23 44 24 3 6
Sexual Assault 100 52 31 13 2 1
Robbery 100 19 55 22 1 3
Aggravated 
Assault
100 29 40 25 2 3
Simple Assault 100 43 37 15 2 1
Burglary 100 43 34 18 2 2
Theft 100 43 38 15 2 1
Auto Theft 100 36 38 21 2 3
Drug 
Trafficking
100 16 65 18 0 1
Other Drug 
Offenses
100 30 47 20 1 1
Weapons 100 26 42 27 1 4
Technical 
Violation*
100 39 39 18 2 2
Status 100 54 31 10 2 1
*Technical violations = violations of probation, parole, and valid court order.
Note: Race proportions do not include youth of Latino ethnicity.  Totals include a small number 
of youth for whom race/ethnicity was not reported or was reported as “other.”  Detail may not 
total 100% because of rounding or because all offenses are not presented.
Source: Sickmund 2004.
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V. PROMISING PRACTICES IN
REHABILITATION AND REENTRY
During the 1950s and 1960s, many scholars and criminal 
justice professionals believed that prisons existed to treat, 
rehabilitate, and reintegrate offenders into society.186  The 
medical (or rehabilitative) model recommended that cor-
rectional institutions create programs to prepare inmates for 
release.  Accordingly, education and vocational programs, 
drug treatment and counseling services, therapeutic com-
munities, and prison industry work programs were important 
elements of prison operations.187  The main idea behind this 
model was that, by participating in these programs, inmates 
were working to impress parole boards by demonstrating that 
they deserved to be released.  It was also believed that such 
programs prepared inmates for reentry.  As described by Seiter 
and Kadela:
Prisons diagnosed inmate problems and provided rehabili-
tative programs to reduce these problems.  Parole boards 
considered inmates’ prison program participation and 
attitude in determining preparation for release and weighed 
the acceptability of the inmates’ release plans in the parole 
decision-making process.  The inmates’ return to the com-
munity was intensely supervised.  If the resources and com-
munity ties were not strong, inmates were placed in halfway 
houses.  In addition, for the first year or two, parole officers 
(whose primary responsibility was to guide the offender to 
programs and services) supervised offenders.188 
In summary, there was a methodical approach to the reentry 
process that focused on the inmates’ transition from prison 
to the community.  This process was not perfect.  Yet, it was 
guided by the premise that positive steps should be taken to 
prepare inmates for life after prison.
During the 1970s, however, a growing coalition of research-
ers, public officials, and private citizens rallied against adult 
and juvenile justice systems for being “too soft” on offenders.  
Their arguments were bolstered by stories of inmates who 
were released from prison only to strike again.  This coalition 
vehemently criticized judges, indeterminate sentencing, parole 
boards, and rehabilitation.  Many of them considered impris-
onment to be the best available weapon in the wars on crime 
and drugs.  
By the 1980s, the rehabilitative model had given way to the 
surveillance or policing model.  Under the new paradigm, 
inmates were no longer seen as being “sick.”  Rather, they had 
landed in prison as a result of “a conscious decision to commit 
crimes.”189  In addition, prison programs were only important 
insofar as they kept inmates busy and maintained order.  At 
the same time, the focus of parole and probation shifted from 
aiding and counseling offenders to risk management.190  Ideas 
regarding treatment, rehabilitation, and reintegration were 
replaced by arguments for deterrence, incapacitation, and 
punishment.  By the end of the 1990s, even as the nation’s 
inmate population exploded, funding for prison programs 
and participation in these programs declined.191
More recently, prisoner reentry has recaptured the attention 
of scholars, criminal justice professionals, lawmakers, and 
activists.  This has occurred, in part, for three reasons.   First, 
more offenders are being released from prison today than 
in the past.  According to the U.S. Department of Justice, 
“Despite changes in release policies, 652,199 adults were 
under State parole supervision at yearend 2000, more than 
a 3-fold increase since 1980, when 196,786 adults were on 
parole.”192  Second, a recent study of recidivism revealed 
that, of 272,111 former inmates tracked by the Department 
of Justice after their release in 1994, within three years 67.5 
percent were rearrested for a new offense, 46.9 percent were 
reconvicted for a new crime, 25.4 percent were re-sentenced 
to prison for a new crime, and 51.8 percent were serving 
time in prison for a new sentence or a technical violation of 
their release.193  Finally, the fiscal realities of state budgeting 
and mass incarceration have led some officials to explore 
new options.  Mauer observes, “Essentially, policymakers are 
faced with a choice of whether they wish to contribute to an 
expanded prison system or provide vital social services.  They 
can no longer do both.”194  Similarly, the National Governors 
Association has argued, “Effective reentry policies save money 
and make better use of limited resources by establishing a 
more coordinated and comprehensive continuum of care and 
supervision.”195 
The Challenges Faced by Former Inmates
Most inmates will eventually return to society; however, ex-
offenders face serious obstacles in their quest to “go straight” 
after being released.  Specifically, because they typically have 
lower levels of educational attainment and poorer job skills 
than the general population, former inmates often struggle 
to find work and avoid future criminality.196  Former inmates 
also experience difficulties with substance abuse and recon-
necting with family, and are often greeted by communities 
that offer them little assistance.  In addition, scholars argue 
that few inmates are receiving the types of services that they 
need to ensure success upon release, as “only a small percent-
age is receiving the benefit of extensive rehabilitation or pre-
release programs.”197  These challenges are oftentimes more 
daunting for racial minorities.198 
What Works? What Doesn’t Work?
When it comes to rehabilitation and recidivism, the idea 
that “nothing works” continues to enjoy currency in some 
political and intellectual circles.  Several researchers, however, 
have identified a number of effective programs and practices 
that offer hope for the future.  Many of these programs have 
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grown out of the new prisoner reentry movement.  Seiter and 
Kadela suggest that reentry programs can be defined as: (1) 
correctional programs that focus on the transition from prison 
to community (e.g., pre-release, work release, halfway houses, 
or specific reentry programs); and (2) programs that initiate 
treatment (e.g., programs to address substance abuse, sex/vio-
lent offences, life skills, education, and cognitive/behavioral 
issues) in a prison setting and are connected with a commu-
nity program to provide continuity of care.199 
Many studies have evaluated the success or failure of reentry 
programs by their ability to reduce recidivism rates.  Some 
analysts have found this to be problematic, particularly when 
researchers focus too closely on the programs that are admin-
istered by criminal justice agencies and, in the process, lose 
sight of the concerns of citizens regarding the enhancement of 
public safety.200  Even so, a general consensus201 exists about 
the success of the following programs or approaches to pris-
oner reentry:
• Family therapy and parent training directed at
delinquents or pre-delinquents and their families;
• Education programs that link prison programs to
community-based resources used after release;
• Vocational training and/or work release programs;
• Programs that promote job readiness skills for ex-
offenders;
• Job training for older males no longer under the
supervision of criminal justice systems;
• Drug treatment and substance abuse programs;
• Prison-based therapeutic communities involving
clients (i.e., inmates) who are housed in a prison 
setting isolated from the general institutional 
population; and
• Halfway houses that assist in the transition from
prison to the community.
These same researchers have suggested that the following types 
of programs may be doomed to fail:
• Gun buy-back efforts;
• “Scared straight” programs; and
• Rehabilitation programs grounded in ambiguous
unstructured counseling.
Practices in the States 
California
Learning from Other States202
• State officials hosted Dr. Reginald A. Wilkerson,
director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation 
and Corrections.  Wilkerson is credited with 
developing a model reentry program in 2002.203   
Ohio has launched a “Release Preparation Program” 
for all inmates, irrespective of their risk assessment 
levels.  The program, which starts six months 
prior to an inmate’s release, “includes employment 
readiness and other workshops and seeks to 
provide transitional linkages so that the inmate will 
continue to receive needed services after release.”204   
Ohio also has established an Office of Reentry and 
Correctional Best Practices.205 
Ending Prison Construction
• In California, 70 percent of former inmates
return to prison within three years of their release.  
This reality, along with the tremendous cost of 
managing the nation’s second-largest prison system, 
has prompted the state to end its thirty-year prison 
construction binge.  As of June 2005, California 
had no prisons under construction and no plans to 
construct new facilities.206 
The Establishment of the Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation
• With the end of prison construction, lawmakers
contend that they are now placing rehabilitation at 
the center of corrections policy.  As of July 1, 2005, 
the state reorganized its Department of Youth and 
Adult Corrections by launching a new Department 
of Corrections and Rehabilitation.  With this new 
entity, the state’s adult and juvenile justice systems 
no longer work autonomously.207 
Reorganizing Parole
• California is currently in the process of reorganizing
its parole policies.  Included among the changes are:
– Affording parole agents alternatives to short-term
imprisonment by allowing them to closely moni-
tor offenders and divert parolees to drug treatment 
programs or job training classes rather than sending 
them back to prison.
– Expanding the Police and Corrections Team
(PACT) programs to give local law enforcement 
better access to the parole system and to give parol-
ees more access to community services.
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Los Angeles County Men’s Central Jail, Social Mentoring 
Academic and Rehabilitative Training (SMART)
• The SMART Program offers health services,
substance abuse treatment, GED courses, anger 
management, and life skills training for gay males 
in the county.  County officials created the program 
in 1999 after discovering that the recidivism rate 
for gay men was higher than that for the general 
population.
The District of Columbia
The Omnibus Juvenile Justice Act of 2004
• Adopted by District lawmakers in late 2004, this
measure blends both the “get tough” and treatment 
approaches to juvenile justice policy.  On the “get 
tough” side, the measure allows judges to order 
parents or caretakers to appear in court with their 
child and to pay up to $10,000 in restitution to 
the victims of their child’s crime.  It also offers 
prosecutors, government agencies, victims, 
and other parties greater access to confidential 
information about youth suspects.  
• At the same time, however, the measure requires
the closure of Oak Hill Academy, an alternative 
middle and high school for adjudicated detained 
and committed youth between the ages of 11 and 
21 years.  In its place, the District will design and 
construct a new smaller facility patterned after the 
Missouri Model, which places and treats young 
people in smaller settings.
• Lastly, the Juvenile Justice Act places greater
emphasis on rehabilitating youth offenders and 
appropriately treating “incompetent juveniles” 
rather than ignoring their deficiencies.208 
Florida
Orange County Jail, Jail Educational and 
Vocational Program
• Since 1987, the Orange County Corrections
Division has offered intensive educational and 
vocational programming to most of its inmates.  
The county jail has roughly 3,300 beds.
Project Re-Connect
• Established in 1998, Project Re-Connect provides
post-release job placement services to former 
inmates (ages 25 and under) who complete either 
a GED or a vocational program during their 
imprisonment.  Individuals who are eligible for the 
program are identified 30 days prior to their release.  
• Project Re-Connect also offers referrals for housing,
food, clothing, transportation, medical services, and 
educational programs. 
The Establishment of the Office of Program, Transition, 
and Post-Release Services
• Created in 2001, the office offers pre- and post-
release programs.  The pre-release program features 
a 100-hour required transitional course, which 
covers topics such as values clarification, goal 
setting and achieving, problem solving and decision 
making, maintaining employment, financial 
management, sexual responsibility, and parenting 
skills.  For post-release programs and services, the 
state has up to 400 beds provided by faith and 
character transitional providers for inmates being 
released from prison. 
• Additional services include: family development,
victim awareness, anger management, rethinking 
personal choice, distance learning, substance abuse, 
and chaplaincy and volunteer programs.
Broward County Sheriff’s Office, Day Reporting and Re-
Entry Division
• Established in 2004, this division offers case
management and transitional services to persons 
serving time in the Broward County jail.  It also has 
two specialized tracks: (A) a Community Service 
Work Program for repeat misdemeanants as an 
alternative to jail, and (B) an Aftercare Program for 
successful graduates of the in-custody ninety-day 
boot camp.
Georgia
Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles, Results-Driven 
Supervision (RDS)
• Researchers with the Board of Pardons found
that special supervision in four behavioral areas 
(education, substance abuse, employment, and 
cognitive skills) produces significant results in 
deterring crime—even in persons once considered 
“intractable.”  Consequently, since 1997, RDS 
has allowed parole officials to assess each parolee 
under their care to determine weaknesses in the 
aforementioned areas and then create “tracks” of 
short- and long-term goals.  Sanctions are issued if a 
former inmate fails to stay on course.  The program 
is credited for increasing the rate of success for 
parolees.




• The county received a grant from the Annie
E. Casey Foundation to develop alternatives to 
pretrial detention for youth offenders who are 
not considered dangerous.  Rather than sending 
juveniles to detention facilities, some are spending 
time at youth service centers.  The county’s 
screening process is rigorous and examines an 
offender’s prior arrest record to ascertain if the child 
should be sent to a detention facility.  Alternatives 
to confinement include home-confinement, 
electronic monitoring, and reporting centers.  Since 
1994, the county has cut its detention population 
in half and sends 90 percent of its juveniles to court 
on time, crime-free.209 
Maryland
Break the Cycle
• With this program, Maryland has developed
“a form of intensive probation focusing on drug 
treatment, drug testing, and sanctions.”210  It 
uses bi-weekly testing for the first two months of 
supervision to detect illegal drug usage.  Testing is 
then reduced to once per week for an additional 
two months.  Thereafter, drug testing is reduced to 
once per month.  Drug testing is increased if the 
offender tests positive.  Program evaluators from the 
University of Maryland found that Break the Cycle 
was effective in reducing drug abuse and re-arrest.  
The Correctional Options Program (COP)
• Introduced in 1994, COP is “a comprehensive
program of graduated sanctions and services that 
was established as a tool to divert carefully screened 
low-risk, drug-involved offenders from prison.  It 
was designed to safeguard the public; assure that 
offenders are accountable for their actions; provide 
substance abuse, educational, vocational, and 
employment services; and strengthen participants’ 
parenting, daily living, and social skills.”211  Analysts 
have found that COP has been an effective tool 
in reducing substance abuse among offenders and 
reducing criminal behavior.
Maryland Division of Correction, Partnerships for Reentry 
Programming (PREP)
• Developed in 2000, PREP acts as an umbrella
for smaller programs, thereby bringing together 
organizations and agencies that help inmates 
develop job skills and secure employment.
Reentry Enforcement Services Targeting Addictions, 
Rehabilitation, and Treatment (RESTART)
• This program will work to coordinate pre-release
services for offenders to prevent recidivism.  It 
connects the state’s programs and services.  
RESTART will be phased in over the next three 
years.  Officials hope to provide a minimum 
of 9,800 units of treatment for inmates.  These 
units will be divided into the following services: 
vocational training/academic instruction, addictions 
treatment, expanded mental health services, 
expanded case management, and pre-release 
programming support.
Michigan
Eliminating Mandatory Minimum Drug Laws
• In December 2002, former Republican Governor
John Engler signed a bill that eliminated mandatory 
minimums for drug crimes.  As reported by the 
Associated Press, the bill “requires judges to follow 
state sentencing guidelines when sending drug 
criminals to prison but gives them more discretion 
by eliminating minimum sentences.”212  Prior to 
this change, Michigan was said to have among 
the harshest drug laws in the country.  Moreover, 
former Governor William Milliken—the man who 
signed the drug laws into effect in 1978—called 
the old measure “the worst mistake of my career” 
and “an overly punishing and cruel response that 
gave no discretion to a sentencing judge, even for 
extenuating circumstances.”213 
Michigan Prisoner Re-Entry Initiative
• Established in 2004, this program is based on the
National Institute of Corrections’ Transition from 
Prison to Community Initiative model (TPCI).  
The TPCI model focuses on critical decision points 
such as assessment and classification, supervision, 
discharge from supervision, and aftercare and 
community services.  The Michigan program starts 
with the inmate intake process and continues 
through incarceration and release.  According to 
the Department of Corrections, once the program 
is fully operational, it will involve partnerships with 
the state and local police agencies, academicians, 
community organizations, faith-based 
organizations, crime victims, and other members of 
the public.
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Mississippi
The Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2005
• The law creates a new system of community-based
programs for youth offenders as an alternative to 
incarceration.  The measure also seeks to provide 
every county in the state access to programs that 
offer after-school services, family counseling, and 
health care.214 
New Mexico
New Mexico Corrections Department, Community 
Corrections
• Community corrections programs mainly serve
offenders in the community who are considered 
to be at higher risk to re-offend and therefore have 
greater treatment needs.  This initiative also serves 
as a diversionary program for probation/parole 
violators who would otherwise be imprisoned.
New York
New York City Department of Health and Hygiene, New 
York City Link
• Since 1996, New York City Link, a short-term
case management linkage program, has focused on 
transition from prison to community for offenders 
with serious and persistent mental illnesses.
New York State Division of Probation and Correctional 
Alternatives, TANF for Community Corrections
• Since 2000, this program has issued annual
contracts to 21 community-based organizations 
and local government programs for programming 
that promotes parental skills training, gainful 
employment, and the reduction of recidivism 
among ex-offenders.
Reforming the Rockefeller Drug Laws
• In December 2004, after decades of failed attempts
to change New York’s drug laws, lawmakers finally 
reached a compromise to soften the penalties under 
the Rockefeller Drug Laws.  Under the changes, a 
low-level first-time drug offender would no longer 
receive a sentence of 15 years to life for his or her 
offense.  Rather, the prison term would be eight 
to twenty years.  Some activists, including hip-
hop mogul Russell Simmons, were pleased with 
the reforms.215  Critics, however, maintain that 
lawmakers have not done enough to reform the 
Rockefeller Drugs Laws, although the state’s drug 
laws are still among the toughest in the country.216 
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Texas
Texas Workforce Commission, Project Reintegrating 
Offenders (RIO)
• Established in 1994, Project RIO is administered
by the Texas Workforce Commission in partnership 
with the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 
the Windham School District, and the Texas 
Youth Commission.  The objective of the program 
is to provide a connection between educational, 
vocational training, and employment services 
during imprisonment and after release.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The nation’s youth of color are experiencing a time of crisis.  
They face daunting challenges to securing a good education, 
finding quality jobs, and becoming productive members of 
the American community.  If we fail to address these issues, 
millions of young people will be fed into the nation’s criminal 
justice systems.  Already, as Marable states, U.S. prisons have 
become “vast warehouses, for the poor and unemployed, for 
low-wage workers and the poorly educated, and, most espe-
cially, for Latino and African American males.”217  
By focusing almost exclusively on the behavior of the indi-
vidual, some researchers and lawmakers have lost sight of 
the political, economic, and social circumstances in which 
individuals exist.  Given the convergence of criminal justice 
policy and the long-running assault on the social welfare state, 
imprisonment has become the first response to many of the 
social problems that burden the poor.  Difficulties such as 
homelessness, unemployment, drug addiction, and mental 
illness “disappear from public view when the human beings 
contending with them are relegated to cages.”218  
Consequently, policymakers must consider changes that will 
help to transform the urban communities in which so many 
of these young people reside.219  The following policy recom-
mendations flow from the analysis presented in this paper:
The Political Discourse on Crime and Punishment
• Rely on research rather than rhetoric.  Lawmakers
must weigh the potential intended and unintended 
consequences of proposed changes in crime and 
drug control policy.
• Consider how racial minorities have been
constructed as targets of public policy.
• Adopt an approach to criminal justice that balances
the needs of society, victims, and inmates.  
Truth-in-Sentencing and Three Strikes and You’re Out
• Repeal or revise Truth-in-Sentencing and Three
Strikes laws that have proven ineffective in the fight 
against crime and drugs.
Drugs and Imprisonment
• Rescind the 100-to-1 powder cocaine/crack cocaine
ratio and other drug sentencing laws that have 
incarcerated nonviolent offenders while failing to 
capture “drug kingpins.”
• Divert nonviolent, non-dangerous drug addicts and
offenders from the prison system.
The Private Corrections Industry
• Conduct an audit of private correctional
institutions to determine: (1) the physical 
conditions of the inmate population, (2) the 
effectiveness of inmate rehabilitation programs 
in these institutions, and (3) the purported cost-
savings of private prisons over public institutions.
Juvenile Justice
• Provide family therapy and parent training directed
at delinquents or pre-delinquents and their families.
• Divert nonviolent and non-dangerous juveniles
from confinement.
• Explore rehabilitation options in community-based
programs for youth offenders.
• Increase job opportunities for minority youth.
Rehabilitation and Prisoner Reentry
•Improve alcohol, drug treatment, and ancillary
services for inmates during their incarceration.
• Strengthen educational and vocational programs.
• Assist inmates in their re-introduction to society
by putting them in touch with institutions and 
organizations that might be of assistance upon 
release.
• Aggressively recruit private businesses to employ
inmates after they are released from prison.
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1965 Johnson (D) Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-197)
•  Authorized a three-year program of financial and technical assistance to state and local
law enforcement agencies.
•  Established the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA) and authorized $10
million to train local law enforcement personnel and augment policing methods. 
1968 Johnson (D) The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (P.L. 90-351)
•  Created block grants that gave states the wherewithal to decide how federal funds were
distributed to localities to improve and strengthen law enforcement.
•  Replaced the OLEA with the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). 
LEAA’s purpose was four-fold: (1) to encourage state comprehensive planning for crimi-
nal justice improvements; (2) to provide technical and financial support to augment and 
strengthen law enforcement and criminal justice; (3) to conduct research and develop-
ment projects to enhance criminal justice operations; and (4) to develop and transfer to 
the states new techniques and methods to cut crime, and identify, capture, and rehabili-
tate criminals.
1970 Nixon (R) The Organized Crime Control Act (P.L. 91-452)
•  Authorized LEAA block grants to assist state and local law enforcement in fighting
organized crime.  
1970 Nixon (R) The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (P.L. 91-513)
•  Unified and revised federal narcotics and dangerous drug laws and the punishments for
violating those laws.
•  Provided new tools to enforce the law. 
•  Authorized expanded drug education and rehabilitation programs.
1970 Nixon (R) The Omnibus Crime Control Act (P.L. 91-644)
•  Augmented federal support to state and local law enforcement agencies through LEAA.
•  Increased the share of cost of crime control programs that might be covered by federal
funds from 60 percent to 75 percent.
•  Required that 20 percent of LEAA funds be spent on corrections.
1974 Ford (R) The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (P.L. 93-415)
•  Designed to “keep juveniles from entering the treadmill of the criminal process, and to
guarantee procedural and constitutional protection to juveniles under Federal 
jurisdiction.”
•  Required deinstitutionalization of status offenders and non-offenders, as well as
the separation of juvenile delinquents from adult offenders, as a condition for state 
participation in the Formula Grants Program.
1976 Ford (R) The Parole Commission and Reorganization Act (P.L. 94-233)
•  Established an independent and regionalized United States Parole Commission.
•  The Commission was charged with providing “fair and equitable parole procedures.”
1976 Ford (R) The Crime Control Act (P.L. 94-503)
•  Extended LEAA for three years.
•  Also created a program that allowed citizen groups to apply for special LEAA funds.
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1976 Carter (D) The Justice System Improvement Act (P.L. 96-157)
•  Required states to distribute a fixed amount of LEAA funds to cities with more than
100,000 residents.  Thus, states had less authority to disapprove applications for funding 
from larger cities.
•  Created the Office of Justice Assistance, Research, and Statistics, the National Institute of
Justice, and the Bureau of Justice Statistics.  These agencies were responsible for collecting, 
analyzing, publishing, and disseminating information on crime, criminal offenders, 
victims of crime, and the operation of justice systems at all levels of government.
1984 Reagan (R) The Comprehensive Crime Control Act (P.L. 98-473)  
•  Overhauled the federal sentencing system, revised the bail statutes to permit pretrial
detention of persons considered dangerous to the community, tightened the legal 
definition of insanity, and instituted mandatory minimum sentences for career criminals.  
•  Increased the maximum fines for serious drug offenders, gave federal prosecutors the
authority to seize the assets of drug traffickers, and created a victim compensation 
program within the Department of Justice.
•  Established a U.S. Sentencing Commission to develop and recommend sentences for
federal crimes.
1986 Reagan (R) The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-570)
•  Authorized $1.7 billion in funds to fight drug abuse, $690 million of which was
earmarked for assisting state and local drug enforcement efforts.
•  Enacted stiffer prison sentences for drug dealers who recruited young people to sell drugs
or who sold narcotics near schools.
•  Created the framework of mandatory minimum penalties for drug trafficking offenses
involving powder cocaine and crack (the “100 to 1” ratio).
1988 Reagan (R) The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690)
•  Authorized $2.7 billion in funds to fight drug abuse.  Actual appropriations raised the
total anti-drug budget to $6.5 billion in fiscal year 1989.
•  Included a death penalty provision for homicides committed by “drug kingpins”—
including the drug-related killing of law enforcement officers.
•  Added a sentence enhancement if the kingpin or someone in their company possessed a
weapon in connection with the offense, even if the weapon was not used or in immediate 
possession.
•  Established more severe penalties for simple possession of drugs for personal usage.
•  Aimed to reduce the demand for drugs through increased treatment and prevention
efforts.
•  Created the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) that was to be headed by
a cabinet-level director (the national drug czar).
•  Required the president to issue an annual drug control strategy.
1989 Bush (R) The International Narcotics Control Act (P.L. 101-231)
•  Authorized $115 million for international narcotics control assistance for fiscal year 1990.
•  Added $125 million for military and law enforcement assistance in Colombia, Peru, and
Bolivia.
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1990 Bush (R) The Comprehensive Violent Crime Control Act (P.L. 101-647)
•  Authorized $200 million in federal matching grants to assist states in establishing more
effective prison programs, including alternatives to incarceration.  
•  Created a grant program to develop and implement multidisciplinary child abuse
investigation.
•  Erected provisions against child pornography that required more stringent record keeping
and enhanced penalties.  
•  Established a $20 million rural drug initiative.
•  Expanded the Public Safety Officers’ Death Benefits program.
•  Authorized additional hiring of FBI and DEA agents.
•  Added 12 chemicals to the list of precursor chemicals regulated under the Chemical
Diversion and Trafficking Act.
1994 Clinton (D) The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (P.L. 103-322)
•  Authorized federal assistance to states to develop, expand, or improve correctional
institutions and programs to ensure prison space for violent repeat offenders, provided 
that the states adopted Truth-in-Sentencing.
•  Required the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment for individuals convicted of a
third violent felony.
•  Designated 60 new offenses punishable by the federal death penalty.
•  Enacted the “Violence Against Women Act of 1994.”
•  Restricted the manufacture, transfer, and possession of certain semiautomatic assault
weapons, and prohibited possession or transfer of large capacity ammunition feeding 
devices.
•  Provided for the prosecution as adults of juveniles 13 years of age or older for certain
violent crimes and for certain crimes involving firearms.
•  Established increased penalties for certain criminal street gang activities, and authorized
use of law enforcement grant funds for anti-gang programs.
•  Increased penalties for certain drug crimes and for driving under the influence of drugs or
alcohol if a minor is seriously injured or killed in an accident.
•  Authorized grants to state and local law enforcement for the creation or improvement of
DNA testing in forensic laboratories, established standards for DNA testing, and required 
the FBI to create a national index of convicted offenders’ DNA profiles.
•  Established a “National Commission on Crime Control and Prevention.”
•  Established the “Ounce of Prevention Council” to administer grant programs for summer
and after-school education and recreation, mentorship, and substance and child abuse 
prevention treatment programs.
1997 Clinton (D) The Drug Free Communities Act (P.L. 105-20)
•  Established a program to support and encourage local communities to reduce substance
abuse among youth.  
•  Sought to build coalitions of young people, parents, businesses, the media, schools, youth
organizations, law enforcement, religious and fraternal organizations, civic groups, and 
state, local, and/or tribal government agencies.
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